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ABSTRACT
Whenever there is a merger between two publicly held companies in the form of a
stock transaction, the companies must provide a proxy-prospectus to their shareholders
with enough information to vote on the proposed merger. The proxy-prospectus contains
mandatory pro forma financial statements as if the firms had merged as of the end of the
previous year. Occasionally, the proxy-prospectus contains voluntary, forward-looking
information, such as projected earnings per share (EPS) or price-to-earnings (PE) ratios
of the combined firm.
There are two reasons that management may provide this voluntary forwardlooking information: 1) management could be providing an optimistic view of the new
firm to persuade the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger or 2) the information
could be used to provide a clearer picture to help management reduce the information
asymmetry between management and shareholders.
This study investigates the factors that increase the likelihood of a merger being
completed. Second, this study examines the impact that important reporting incentives
and firm characteristics have on whether or not firms choose to voluntarily disclose
earnings estimates. Lastly, this study examines earnings forecast bias and the factors
related to the accuracy and bias of the voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates.
Results indicate that shareholders of bidder firms that are weaker financially are
more likely to approve a merger suggesting that shareholders of weaker firms might be
trying to get stronger by merging with another firm. Second, bidder firms with stronger
financial characteristics and target firms with weaker financial characteristics are more
apt to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. Additionally, for those firms that provided
EPS forecasts, the forecasts were positively biased.
v

These findings indicate that

management of bidder firms that are stronger financially may use these voluntary EPS
forecasts to enhance the future outlook of the firm.
Lastly, firms that provided voluntary earnings estimates were examined. Results
indicate that firms with stronger corporate governance provided more accurate and less
biased EPS forecasts. This suggests that corporate governance, which is in place to
protect shareholder rights, is doing its job.

vi

1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to examine the characteristics of those firms that
voluntarily disclose forward-looking earnings estimates in the proxy-prospectus when
completing a merger. This study examines whether or not voluntarily disclosing earnings
estimates increases the likelihood of a merger being completed. For those firms that
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, this study also examines the bias and accuracy of
the estimates as well as the financial and corporate governance characteristics of the
firms that produce more accurate forecasts.
At the time of the proxy-prospectus, the boards of directors and management for
both firms have decided to go forward with the merger and have agreed on the postmerger management compensation. In the Titan Corp. - Lockheed Martin Corp. merger,
the post-merger management compensation included severance payments of three times
the sum of the base salary and highest bonus, fully vesting options and retirement plans,
$100,000 in outplacement services, and $800,000 for an office and secretary during the
next five years. These amounts totaled $10 million for the top three executives. In the
Shell Oil - Quaker State merger, executives and directors received a cash payment of all
vested and unvested options and two times the sum of their annual salary and target
bonus. This post-merger compensation provides an incentive for management to provide
shareholders with enough information to increase the likelihood that the merger will be
completed. The voluntarily provided, forward-looking information could be interpreted
in one of two ways: 1) the information could be used to provide an optimistic picture of
the new firm to persuade the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger or 2) the
information could be used to provide a clearer picture to help management reduce the
information asymmetry between management and shareholders.
1

When two companies merge, there are four important dates: 1) the announcement
date, 2) the proxy-prospectus filing date, 3) the proxy vote date, and 4) the merger date.
The announcement date is the date that management announces to the public that there is
a proposed merger, the proxy-prospectus filing date is the date that the firms provide
information to the shareholders, the proxy vote date is the date that shareholders of both
the bidder and target firms vote on the proposed merger, and the merger date is the
effective date of the merger. When both companies are publicly traded and there is a
stock transaction in connection with the merger, the firms must provide shareholders with
a proxy-prospectus detailing the merger and allowing the stockholders to vote on the
proposed merger. The filing date of the proxy-prospectus comes after the announcement
date and before the merger date. Figure 1 provides a timeline of events associated with a
typical merger or acquisition.

12/31/2001 3/31/2002
Bidder

5/31/2002 6/30/2002 9/30/2002

12/31/2002

Combined Firm
Target

Announcement
Date

ProxyProspectus
Filing
Date*

Proxy
Vote
Date

Merger
Date

Earnings
Announcement

Figure 1: Timeline of events associated with a typical merger or acquisition
(using hypothetical dates)
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged
on 12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the
completed firm as of 12/31/2002
2

Included in the proxy-prospectus is mandatory information such as merger
consideration, voting rights, and pro forma financial statements as if the two firms had
merged at the end of the previous year. Additionally, the proxy-prospectus may include
some forward-looking information, such as forecasted earnings per share (EPS) or the
forecasted price-to-earnings ratio (PE Ratio) of the combined firm.

These earnings

estimates are voluntary and are not provided in all proxy prospectus filings. Since these
earnings estimates are voluntary, it provides a setting in which to investigate several
aspects of firms’ reporting behavior. First, this study investigates whether voluntarily
disclosing these earnings estimates increases the probability of completing a merger.
Second, this study examines the impact that important reporting incentives and firm
characteristics (including financial and corporate governance characteristics) have on
whether or not firms choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. Lastly, this study
examines factors related to the accuracy and bias of the voluntarily disclosed earnings
estimates.
While Brennan [1999] examined voluntary disclosure prior to and during the
announcement, the current study extends the voluntary disclosure literature by examining
the firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure at the time of the proxy-prospectus. The
time of the proxy-prospectus is important because it is filed at a time when there may be
tension between the incentives of management and the shareholders. Also, incentive
conflicts may exist between the boards of directors and management prior to the merger
agreement. Management of the target firm must agree on post-merger compensation
since their firm will no longer be in existence while the management of the bidder firm
will be held accountable for the quality of the merger. At the time of the proxyprospectus, management of both firms know the consequences of the merger and have
3

agreed to move forward with the merger, therefore it is assumed that the conflicts
between the boards of directors and management have been resolved once the postmerger compensation has been negotiated.

This study focuses on the information

voluntarily disclosed to the shareholders at the time of the proxy-prospectus.
By examining the financial and corporate governance characteristics of both the
bidder and target firms, this study identifies the characteristics of the firms that choose to
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. Stronger financial and corporate governance
characteristics may suggest that management voluntarily discloses earnings estimates to
reduce the asymmetric information between management and shareholders, while weaker
financial and corporate governance characteristics suggest that management voluntarily
discloses earnings estimates to persuade their shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.
In other words, firms that are stronger financially or have stronger corporate governance
may provide as much information as possible since there is no need to hide the
information from the shareholders, while firms that are weaker financially or have
weaker corporate governance may need to provide information to persuade shareholders
to vote in favor of the merger.
Additionally, the voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates are examined to
determine if they are optimistically biased and to determine if the earnings estimates
enhance the likelihood of a merger being completed. Optimistically biased earnings
estimates may be indicative of management using voluntary disclosure to persuade
shareholders to vote in favor of the merger.

Lastly, the financial and corporate

governance characteristics of the firms that voluntarily disclose earnings estimates are
analyzed to examine the factors that may increase forecast accuracy.

4

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; the next chapter describes the
related literature. Chapter 3.0 develops the hypotheses, chapter 4.0 presents details of the
research methodology employed, chapter 5.0 reports empirical analysis and results, and
chapter 6.0 summarizes and concludes the paper.
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2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Mergers and acquisitions have been extensively researched in the finance
literature. Most of this literature focuses on stock price returns of the target and bidder
firms before, during, and after the merger or acquisition. Asquith et al. [1983]; Bradley
[1980]; Bradley et al. [1983]; Dodd and Ruback [1977]; Eckbo [1983]; Jarrell and
Bradley [1980]; Kummer and Hoffmeister [1978]; Malatesta [1983], and Ruback [1983]
examined large window effects (1 month) around the announcement date and found that
target firms have high returns (approximately 20%) while bidding firms have much lower
returns (between 2% and 6%) around the announcement date.

Other studies have

examined small window effects (1-5 days) of mergers and found that target firms
received returns around 8% while bidder firms had insignificant returns (Asquith et al.
[1983]; Dodd [1980]; and Eckbo [1983]).
Jarrell et al. [1988] examined the source of the gains that are associated with
mergers and acquisitions and found no evidence of systematic losses by the bidding firms
that would offset the large gains that the target firms are receiving. These findings
suggest that mergers and acquisitions create value to the economy.
Other merger and acquisition studies have examined the types of firms that
choose to merge. There is some evidence of industry clustering of mergers due to
industry shocks that require firms to merge to be more productive (Andrade et al. [2001];
Gort [1969], Healy et al. [1992]; Jensen [1986]; and Jensen [1993]). Healy et al. [1992]
extend the previous studies by examining post-merger operating performance of firms
compared to the industry median and found that merged firms performed better than their
non-merged industry counterparts providing additional evidence that mergers and
acquisitions are beneficial to the economy.
6

Given that mergers and acquisitions appear to provide value to the economy and
that target firms appear to benefit more from a merger, it is beneficial to determine how
managers convince the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger since an agency
conflict may exist between management and shareholders. For example, at the time of
the proxy-prospectus, management of the two firms have negotiated and completed their
post-merger compensation and may have different incentives than the shareholders.
Jensen and Meckling [1976] pointed out that agency problems exist with any company in
which the owner is not also the operator.1 Corporate governance, including contracting,
disclosure, and monitoring may help control agency problems by reducing the
asymmetric information and incentive conflicts between management and shareholders.
Most voluntary disclosure literature deals with the frequency and time in which a
company chooses to voluntarily disclose information. Lang and Lundholm [2000] found
that there was a significant increase in disclosures regarding performance and more
management interpretation of the firm’s performance beginning six months prior to the
offering. There is also an increase in disclosure as the end of the year approaches, which
reduces the external factors that may increase the forecast error (Waymire [1985] and
McNichols [1989]).
Myers and Majluff [1984] indicated that companies making public equity or debt
offerings have incentives to voluntarily disclose information to reduce information
asymmetry. Increased information asymmetry between management and shareholders
increases the risk associated with the transaction, and therefore decreases the stock price
of the firm. Without the disclosure of earnings estimates, shareholders are left with
1

An agency problem may exist in a merger and acquisition setting once the boards of directors and
management have agreed on their post-merger compensation. At the time of the proxy prospectus,
management may be acting in their best interest rather than the best interest of the shareholders of the firm.
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insufficient information to make informed decisions as to whether or not the merger is
economically beneficial.
Healy and Palepu [2001] discuss six forces that affect managers’ disclosure
decisions. These forces include capital market transactions, corporate control contests,
stock compensation, litigations, proprietary costs, and management talent signaling.
Capital market transactions will increase the quantity of disclosures in the merger and
acquisition process, while corporate control may increase the accuracy of the disclosures.
Cox [1985]; Imhoff [1978]; Ruland [1979]; and Waymire [1985] examine the
differences between those firms that issue earnings estimates and those firms that do not.
They found that firms that issue earnings estimates are larger, have smoother, less
volatile earnings, and have more accurate analyst forecasts. Other characteristics that
may increase the likelihood of firms issuing voluntary earnings forecasts include firms
that had previously provided earnings forecasts (Frankel et al. [1995] and Ruland et al.
[1990]) and firms within the same industry (Andrade et al. [2001]; Botosan and Harris
[2000]; Gort [1969]; Jensen [1986]; and Jensen [1993]).
Additionally, Clarkson et al. [1992] examined some of the characteristics of those
firms that disclosed earnings forecasts in Canadian IPO prospectuses and found that audit
quality, underwriter prestige, and terms of offering are all reasons that a firm may issue
earnings estimates.

These findings indicate that corporate governance factors may

increase the likelihood of an earnings estimate. Corporate governance factors that may
decrease the frequency of management forecasts include the threat of competitor entry or
a decrease in the percentage of the voting stock owned by management (Clarkson et al.
[1992] and Ruland et al. [1990]).

8

Another possible reason for management to voluntarily disclose information is to
influence the cost of equity. Botosan [1997] examined the cost of equity capital and
voluntary disclosure and found that for smaller firms with less analyst following, there
was a lower cost of equity capital for those firms that voluntarily disclosed background
information, historical results, key non-financial statistics, projected information or
management discussion and analysis in the annual report.
Additional literature addresses the issue of accuracy and bias of management
forecasts. Ajinkya and Gift [1984]; Pownall and Waymire [1989]; and Waymire [1984]
examined the stock price effect and the information content of management forecasts.
They found that management forecasts provided the market with management’s expected
beliefs of the firm’s future earnings. Each of these studies found that management
forecasts provided information to the market and that the stock price moved in the
direction of the news. That is, good news resulted in positive stock price movements, and
bad news resulted in negative stock price movements. Ajinkya and Gift [1984] also
indicated that management forecasts were slightly biased.
Waymire [1986] and Hassell and Jennings [1986] examined the accuracy of
management’s forecasts as compared to analysts’ forecasts and found that management’s
forecast are more accurate than prior analysts’ forecast. Hassell et al. [1988] found that
analysts revised their forecast once management provided the information, and Imhoff
[1978] found that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate for companies that provided
management forecasts.

Together these studies provide evidence that management’s

forecasts are being used by analysts and provide information to the market. Thus,
managers have a reasonable basis for believing that providing earnings forecasts would
be an effective mechanism for convincing shareholders to approve a merger.
9

One mechanism for management to provide a better earnings forecast is to utilize
earnings management. Christie and Zimmerman [1994]; DeAngelo [1988]; Grossman
and Hart [1980]; Groff and Wright [1989]; and Grossman and Hart [1981] found that
target firm managers make more income increasing accounting choices than their nontarget counterparts.

Erickson and Wang [1999] found evidence that bidding firms

overstate their earnings reports in the quarter preceding a stock swap announcement and
indicate that the market expects this overstatement and discounts the stock price
accordingly.
Brennan [1999] examined the voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts by target
firms in the UK. The bids were broken into three categories: friendly bids, hostile bids,
or competing bids. Brennan [1999] then combined hostile and competing bids into one
category and called this category contested bids. His study determined that there were
different motivations between the two types of bids. In friendly bids, the bidder may
require the disclosure from the target firm and the earnings estimates are generally used
to justify managements’ recommendation to the shareholders, while in contested bids,
management of the target firm discourages completion of the merger by disclosing
information that would indicate the shares of the target firm are more valuable than the
bid price or by indicating that existing management would be better at running the target
firm than the bidder.
While Brennan [1999] examined information prior to the announcement, the
current study extends the literature by examining the financial and corporate governance
characteristics and voluntary disclosure at the time of the proxy-prospectus. The proxyprospectus is filed after the merger has been announced and after the boards of directors
and management of the two firms have already agreed upon the merger.
10

3.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

The proxy-prospectus of the merging firms include mandatory information such
as merger consideration, voting rights, and pro forma financial statements as if the two
firms had merged at the end of the previous year. Additionally, the proxy-prospectus
may include some forward-looking information such as forecasted EPS or forecasted PE
Ratio of the combined firm. These financial estimates are voluntary and are not provided
in all proxy-prospectus filings. The current study examines the firms that provide this
voluntary information to determine whether the information contributes to the success of
completing a merger, what types of firms provide the voluntary information, is the
voluntary information biased, and what types of firms provide more accurate information.
3.1

Voluntary Disclosure and Merger Success
At the time of the proxy-prospectus, the boards of directors and management of

the two firms have already agreed on the terms for the completion of the merger or
acquisition and now have an incentive to provide the shareholders information needed for
their approval of the announced merger. The first step in this study is to investigate
whether or not the voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the likelihood of a
merger being completed. Additionally, the financial characteristics of the bidder and
target firms are investigated to determine their effect on merger success.
Brennan [1999] broke bids into three categories: friendly bids, hostile bids, and
competing bids and combined hostile and competing bids into one category and found
that mergers were less likely to be completed when they were hostile or competing bids
than when they were friendly bids. Additionally, Andrade et al. [2001] found that larger
firms that are in the same industry are more likely to complete a merger.

11

Other factors that may increase the likelihood of the merger being completed are
whether the bidder firm can influence the decisions of the target firm or if there is a high
price premium paid to the target. One way for the bidder firm to influence the decision of
the target firm is for the bidder firm to be significantly larger than the target firm making
it difficult for the target firm to vote against the merger. One example of the bidder firm
being larger than the target firm is the IBM - Rational Software merger where IBM had
over 50 times the total assets of Rational Software.
If management has an incentive to make sure that the merger is approved, then
management may use the voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates as a mechanism to
persuade stockholders to vote in favor of the merger. Based on the above, the first
hypothesis is stated in the alternative format:
H1a: Voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the likelihood that a
merger will be completed.
Additionally, the financial characteristics of the bidder and target firms may affect
whether or not a merger is completed. Firms with stronger financial characteristics may
increase shareholder confidence, which may increase the likelihood of a merger being
completed. Alternatively, shareholders of stronger firms may be less likely to approve a
merger if they perceive the other firm as weaker. Another explanation could be that
shareholders of firms with weaker financial characteristics are looking for ways to
strengthen the firm. One possible way to strengthen the firm is by merging with another
firm. Merging with another firm increases market share and decreases costs by creating
synergy between the two firms (Ghosh 2004). Utilizing this rationalization, firms with
weaker financial characteristics may be more likely to complete the merger.

12

Based on the alternative reasoning provided above, the following non-directional
set of hypotheses is provided:
H1b: There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and
the likelihood of the merger being completed.
H1c: There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and
the likelihood of the merger being completed.
Figure 2 reflects the timeline relationship of hypothesis one with the events
associated with a typical merger or acquisition.

The next section discusses the

characteristics of firms that voluntarily disclose financial information.

12/31/2001 3/31/2002 5/31/2002 6/30/2002
Bidder

9/30/2002

12/31/2002

Combined Firm
Target

Announcement
Date

ProxyProspectus
Filing
Date*

Proxy
Vote
Date

Merger
Date

Earnings
Announcement

H1
Figure 2: Timeline relationship of hypothesis one with the events associated with a
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates)
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined
firm as of 12/31/2002
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3.2

Characteristics of Firms that Voluntarily Disclose Earnings Estimates
As previously discussed, management has an incentive to complete the merger,

and firms have a choice of whether or not to voluntarily disclose forward-looking
information to their shareholders in the proxy-prospectus. The current study compares
the financial and corporate governance characteristics of firms that choose to voluntarily
disclose information to the characteristics of firms that choose not to voluntarily disclose
information in the proxy-prospectus.
There are several firm characteristics that may increase voluntary disclosure.
Lang and Lundholm [2000] and Myers and Majluff [1984] reported an increase in
disclosure during the time of an equity offering. The increased disclosure provided hype
which led to a lower cost of capital. Additionally, Healy and Palepu [2001] included
capital market transactions and corporate control contests as two reasons for managers to
voluntarily disclose information. The current study examines mergers and acquisitions
(one example of a capital market transaction), to determine what firm characteristics may
cause managers to disclose voluntary information.
Cox [1985]; Imhoff [1978]; Ruland [1979]; and Waymire [1985] indicated that
firms that issue forecasts are larger and have smoother, less volatile earnings than firms
that did not issue forecasts. Clarkson et al. [1992] found that audit quality, underwriter
prestige, and terms of the offering were all reasons that firms may issue forecasts.
Additionally, Andrade et al. [2001], Gort [1969], Jensen [1986], Jensen [1993], and
Botosan and Harris [2000] found that firms in the same industry were more likely to
provide earnings forecasts.
Ruland et al. [1990] and Frankel et al. [1995]) found that firms that had
previously provided earnings forecasts are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in the
14

future.

Of course, firms that have never issued an earnings forecast may issue an

earnings forecast in the joint proxy-prospectus, and conversely, firms that have issued an
earnings forecast in every year may not provide a forecast in the joint proxy-prospectus.
Without examining the future success of the merger, determining if providing an earnings
forecast is a positive or negative signal is very difficult. In this study, the prior earnings
forecasts are simply used as a control, since previous studies have found that firms that
have issued earnings forecasts in the past are more likely to issue earnings forecasts in the
future.
The current study examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics
of both the bidder and target firms that choose to voluntarily disclose the earnings
estimates as opposed to those firms that choose not to disclose any earnings estimates to
their shareholders in the proxy-prospectus during a typical merger or acquisition.
Possibly, firms with stronger financial and corporate governance characteristics are
willing to provide more disclosure to reduce the asymmetric information between
management and shareholders or those firms with weaker characteristics may disclose
more to persuade its shareholders to vote in favor of the merger. The current study
identifies “weak” characteristics to include either poor financial performance or weak
corporate governance.

Poor financial performance is also the primary predictor of

litigation, which Healy and Palepu [2001] identify as an important determinant of
managers’ disclosure decisions.
Dating back to Ball and Brown [1968] and Beaver [1968], scholars have found
that accounting has provided valued information to the market. Diamond and Verrecchia
[1991] and Kim and Verrecchia [1994] argue that voluntary disclosure accomplishes this
same feat.

By providing additional information to the shareholders, the decreased
15

information asymmetry provides investors with more confidence in the value of the firm.
If additional information increases shareholder confidence in the value of the firm,
stronger firms may voluntarily disclose information to their shareholders to decrease the
information asymmetry between management and shareholders.
Another

reason

management

may

voluntarily

disclose

forward-looking

information in a merger and acquisition setting is to “sell” the merger to the shareholders.
If management is using information to “sell” the merger, weaker firms may provide
optimistic forecasts to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger. While there
is a cost to providing optimistic forecasts, Erickson and Wang [1999] find evidence that
acquiring firms overstate earnings in the quarter prior to a stock swap, and that the market
anticipates the overstated earnings and discounts the firm’s stock price to compensate for
the inflated earnings.
Jensen and Meckling [1976] pointed out that agency problems exist when the
incentives of the owners and management are not aligned. One example of an agency
problem that may exist in a merger and acquisition setting is a golden parachute for the
CEO of the target firm. Management is concerned about their post-merger income and
job prospects while shareholders are interested in the value of their shares. While one
can argue that contracting could cause golden parachutes to be value increasing, in the
case of a merger or acquisition, a golden parachute provides management with an
incentive to provide information that may persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the
merger.
If management is trying to “sell” the merger to its shareholders, then firms with
weaker financial performance as measured by Altman’s Z-Score and weaker corporate
governance characteristics as measured by the G-Index will be more likely to voluntarily
16

disclose earnings estimates. If firms with stronger financial and corporate governance
characteristics voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, the finding suggests that stronger
firms provide more information to reduce information asymmetry between management
and shareholders. Given the alternative reasoning provided above, the following set of
non-directional hypotheses is provided:
H2a: There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and
the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings
estimates.
H2b: There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and
the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings
estimates.
H2c: There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of
the bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily
disclose earnings estimates.
H2d: There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of
the target firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily
disclose earnings estimates.
H2e:

There is an association between target firms that have CEO golden

parachutes and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily
disclose earnings estimates.
Figure 3 reflects the timeline relationship of hypotheses two with the events
associated with at typical merger or acquisition. The next section discusses earnings
estimate bias.

17

12/31/2001 3/31/2002 5/31/2002 6/30/2002
Bidder

9/30/2002

12/31/2002

Combined Firm
Target

Announcement
Date

ProxyProspectus
Filing
Date*

Proxy
Vote
Date

Merger
Date

Earnings
Announcement

H2

Figure 3: Timeline relationship of hypothesis two with the events associated with a
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates)
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined
firm as of 12/31/2002
3.3

Earnings Estimate Bias
At the time of the proxy-prospectus, management of both the bidder and target

firms have already agreed upon the terms of the merger. Management now has an
incentive to provide information that will help persuade shareholders to vote in favor of
the merger. In the proxy-prospectus, firms typically voluntarily disclose forward-looking
earnings information in one of two ways: an EPS forecast or a projected PE Ratio of the
new firm. The EPS provides earnings per share of the company for the previous
accounting period and the PE Ratio is used to measure investors’ expectation of higher
earnings growth. Since EPS and PE Ratio are two very different measures of financial
strength, the mergers are separated into two samples and examined separately.
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Firms may provide optimistic forecasts to paint a more favorable picture of the
completed merger or firms may provide more information to reduce information
asymmetry. An optimistically biased earnings estimate provides evidence that
management uses voluntary disclosure to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the
merger while an unbiased earnings estimate provides evidence that management provides
information to reduce information asymmetry.
While EPS and PE Ratios are very different estimates, both are used by investors
to determine the strength of the firm. Since it is considered better for these two measures
to be high, similar results are anticipated for both samples. Based on the above, the
following set of hypotheses is tested:
H3a: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the EPS forecast of the new firm is positively
biased.
H3b: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the PE Ratio forecast of the new firm is
positively biased.
This study now examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics
of the firms that voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts. While prior literature focuses on
characteristics that increase forecast accuracy, the expectation that some of these same
characteristics will decrease forecast bias. The size of the firm, whether or not the firm
has issued previous earnings forecasts, auditor quality, and underwriter prestige are
characteristics that increase the accuracy of the forecasts (Clarkson et al. [1992] and
Clarkson [2000]). Additionally, forecasts that are issued closer to the end of the year
provide more accurate forecasts (Waymire [1985] and McNichols [1989]).
Firms that are stronger financially and have stronger corporate governance
characteristics should have less incentive to provide forecasts that are biased. Based on
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the above discussion, the following set of hypotheses is tested:
H3c: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging
firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
H3d: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging
firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H3e: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
H3f:

Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with

merging firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
Figure 4 reflects the timeline relationship of hypothesis three with the events
associated with a typical merger or acquisition.

The next section discusses the

characteristics of firms with greater forecast accuracy.
12/31/2001 3/31/2002 5/31/2002 6/30/2002
Bidder

9/30/2002

12/31/2002

Combined Firm
Target

Announcement
Date

ProxyProspectus
Filing
Date*

Proxy
Vote
Date

Merger
Date

Earnings
Announcement

H3
Figure 4: Timeline relationship of hypothesis three with the events associated with a
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates)
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined
firm as of 12/31/2002
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3.4

Characteristics of Firms with Greater Forecast Accuracy
Once the firms that have voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates to their

shareholders have been identified, the characteristics that are associated with greater
forecast accuracy will be examined. Some of the same characteristics that increase the
likelihood of providing forecasts will also increase the accuracy of the forecasts. For
instance, the size of the firm, whether or not the firm has issued previous earnings
forecasts, auditor quality, and underwriter prestige are all characteristics that may
increase the accuracy of the forecasts (Clarkson et al. [1992] and Clarkson [2000]).
Auditors are involved in the entire merger and acquisition process and provide a
monitoring service that should increase the validity of all information provided in the
proxy-prospectus. Additionally, Waymire [1985] and McNichols [1989] indicated that
management forecasts are more accurate as they are issued closer to year end creating the
need to control for the amount of time between the forecast date and the actual earnings
date.
Stronger firms should provide better information to their shareholders. If this
rationale is true, firms with stronger financial and corporate governance characteristics
will provide more accurate forecasts.

Based upon the above, the following set of

hypotheses is tested (stated in the alternative form):
H4a: EPS forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging firms
that have stronger financial characteristics.
H4b: EPS forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging firms
that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H4c: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging
firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
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H4d: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of the combined firm is associated with merging
firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
Figure 5 reflects the timeline relationship of hypothesis four with the events
associated with a typical merger or acquisition. The next section provides an overview of
the hypotheses and how they relate to one another.
12/31/2001 3/31/2002 5/31/2002 6/30/2002
Bidder

9/30/2002

12/31/2002

Combined Firm

Target

Announcement
Date

ProxyProspectus
Filing
Date*

Proxy
Vote
Date

Merger
Date

Earnings
Announcement

H4
Figure 5: Timeline relationship of hypothesis four with the events associated with a
typical merger or acquisition (using hypothetical dates)
*Firms provide a mandatory pro forma financial statement as if the firms had merged on
12/31/2001 and may voluntarily provide forecasted EPS or PE ratios of the combined
firm as of 12/31/2002

3.5

Overview of Hypotheses
At the time of the proxy-prospectus, the boards of directors and management for

both firms have decided to go forward with the merger and have agreed on the postmerger management compensation. In some instances, management provides voluntary
earnings estimates in the proxy-prospectus. Two reasons that management may provide
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this voluntary information are 1) to provide an optimistic view of the new firm or 2) to
provide information to reduce the information asymmetry between management and
stockholders.
The first set of hypotheses examines firms that have decided to voluntarily
disclose or not disclose earnings estimates.

Since management has an incentive to

complete the merger, disclosing earnings estimates should be used to increase the
likelihood of the merger being completed. Additionally, financial characteristics of the
bidder and target firms are examined to determine if firms that have stronger or weaker
financial characteristics are more likely to complete the merger.
The second set of hypotheses moves one step further by examining the
characteristics of those firms that choose to voluntarily disclose as opposed to those firms
that choose not to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.

Do firms with weaker

financial and corporate governance characteristics need to voluntarily disclose
information to show that the merger benefits the shareholders or are firms with stronger
financial and corporate governance characteristics just providing as much information as
possible to reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders?
The third set of hypotheses determines if the earnings forecasts are biased. If
firms with weaker financial and corporate governance characteristics are trying to
persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, they may need to provide an
earnings forecast that paints a bright future for the combined firm. One way to paint a
more favorable picture is to provide an optimistically biased earnings forecast.
Additionally, the financial and corporate governance characteristics of the bidder and
target firm are examined to determine what factors may decrease forecast bias.
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The fourth set of hypotheses examines those financial and corporate governance
characteristics of the firms that voluntarily provide earnings forecasts to determine what
types of firms provide more accurate earnings forecasts.
Table 1 provides a summary of the research hypotheses and chapter 4 describes
the sample and defines the variables used to test the above hypotheses. The next section
of the paper explains the research methodology employed.
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Table 1 - Summary of Hypotheses
H1a: Voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the likelihood that a merger
will be completed.
H1b: There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and the
likelihood of the merger being completed.
H1c: There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and the
likelihood of the merger being completed.
H2a: There is an association between the financial strength of the bidder firm and the
decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H2b: There is an association between the financial strength of the target firm and the
decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H2c: There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of the
bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose
earnings estimates.
H2d: There is an association between the strength of the corporate governance of the
target firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose
earnings estimates.
H2e: There is an association between target firms that have CEO golden parachutes and
the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings
estimates.
H3a: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the EPS forecast of the new firm is positively
biased.
H3b: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the PE Ratio forecast of the new firm is positively
biased.
H3c: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging firms that
have stronger financial characteristics.
H3d: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging firms
that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H3e: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging
firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
H3f: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with merging firms
that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H4a: EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that have
stronger financial characteristics.
H4b: EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that have
stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H4c: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that
have stronger financial characteristics..
H4d: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with merging firms that
have stronger corporate governance.
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4.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section of the paper describes the sample selection procedures used to arrive
at the final samples for the hypotheses, the variable definitions, and the research design
employed to test each set of hypotheses.
4.1

Sample and Variable Definitions

4.1.1

Sample Selection
The sample chosen for this study was collected from Thompson Financial’s,

Securities Data Corp. (SDC) database and includes mergers with a transaction value of
$1,000,000 or more that were announced during the years 2002 and 2003. Tudor and
Mohtadi [1997] compared the SDC database with five print databases and found that
every transaction of $1,000,000 or more that was listed in the five print databases was
listed in the SDC database.2 This study chooses $1,000,000 as a minimum transaction
value to provide a more manageable data set by eliminating the smaller firms that may
not have data readily available and by reducing the number of mergers that may be
considered immaterial. These restrictions provide a beginning sample of 3,077 total
mergers as opposed to 16,295 total mergers without these restrictions. The years 2002
and 2003 were used so that the study could use the two most recent years that actual
earnings could be collected for up to three years after the merger announcement. Three
years after the merger announcement is necessary since some of the earnings forecasts
are provided three years in advance. This sample reduction provides a beginning sample
of 2,901 announced mergers that were completed and 176 mergers that were withdrawn.

2

The print databases used were Mergers and Acquisitions, the Corporate Growth Report, the Merger
Yearbook, the Merger and Acquisition Sourcebook, and SDC’s Worldwide M&D Database
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Using the 3,077 (2,901 completed and 176 withdrawn) announced mergers in
Thompson Financial’s SDC database for the years 2002 and 2003, SEC’s Edgar database
was searched to find 139 completed mergers and 8 withdrawn mergers that had filed a
joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4).
The proxy-prospectus includes mandatory information such as merger
consideration; golden parachute payment details; and pro forma financial statements of
the merged entity as if the merger had occurred in the year prior to merger
announcement. Additionally, 57 of the mergers provided other voluntary information
including projected EPS estimates or a projected PE Ratio of the combined firm.
4.1.2

Hypotheses One Sample
The first set of hypotheses examines factors that may increase the likelihood of a

merger being completed. Of the 147 (139 completed and 8 withdrawn) mergers in the
sample, the premium paid for 22 mergers was not calculated due to either the bidder or
target firms not being traded on a major stock exchange. This sample reduction brings
the sample for the first set of hypotheses to 125 mergers, including 117 completed
mergers and 8 withdrawn mergers.
Table 2 – Hypotheses One Sample Selection Procedures
Reduced Sample

147 Mergers

Less: Data missing to compute the premium paid

(22) Mergers

Less: Data missing to compute Bidder Z-Score (BFIN)

(17) Mergers

Less: Data missing to compute Target Z-Score (TFIN)

(16) Mergers

Equals Hypotheses One Final Sample

92 Mergers
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Of the 125 mergers, the financial strength variables (BFIN and TFIN)3 could not
be calculated for 39 mergers, thus reducing the final sample for the first set of hypotheses
to 92 mergers. Table 2 provides information on the sample selection for the first set of
hypotheses. The following section examines the sample selection procedures used to test
the second set of hypotheses.
4.1.3

Hypotheses Two Sample
The second set of hypotheses examines the characteristics of firms that choose to

voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.

The financial strength variables (BFIN and

TFIN) could not be calculated for 39 mergers while the corporate governance variables
BGINDEX and TGINDEX could not be calculated for an additional 72 mergers. The
final sample for the second set of hypotheses includes 28 mergers in which all variables
could be calculated. Table 3 provides information on the final sample for the second set
of hypotheses. The next section examines the sample selection procedures used to test
the third and fourth sets of hypotheses.
Table 3 – Hypotheses Two Sample Selection Procedures
Reduced Sample

147 Mergers

Less: Mergers withdrawn

(8) Withdrawn Mergers

Equals Total Completed Mergers

139 Completed Mergers

Less: Data missing to compute Bidder Z-Score (BFIN)

(19) Mergers

Less: Data missing to compute Target Z-Score (TFIN)

(20) Mergers

Less: Data missing for BGINDEX

(16) Mergers

Less: Data missing for TGINDEX

(56) Mergers

Equals Hypotheses Two Final Sample

28 Mergers

3

The variable BFIN is measured as Altman’s Z-score for the bidder firm and the variable TFIN is
measured as Altman’s Z-score of the target firm. These variables are further explained in section 4.2.2.1.
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4.1.4

Hypotheses Three and Four Samples
To examine the bias and accuracy of the earnings forecasts, the sample is limited

to companies choosing to provide EPS estimates or PE Ratio estimates for the merged
entity. Of the sample of 139 completed mergers, there were a total of 69 forecasts from
57 mergers. Eleven mergers provided forecasts for more than one year, and one merger
provided both a forecasted EPS and a forecasted PE Ratio. For the eleven firms that
provided forecasts for more than one year, the forecast closest to the announcement date
is used. For the one firm that provided an EPS and a PE Ratio forecast, both forecasts are
examined bringing the total EPS forecasts to 30 and the total PE Ratio forecasts to 28.
These 58 forecasts are used to determine if the EPS and PE Ratio forecasts are biased.
Panel A of table 4 presents information on the final sample selection procedures for
hypotheses H3a and H3b.
Once the tests establish whether or not the forecasts are biased, the study then
focuses on the firm characteristics that may decrease earnings forecast bias. The 30
mergers that produced EPS forecasts are examined to determine the firm characteristics
that may decrease EPS forecast bias. This sample begins with 30 mergers, of which, the
financial strength of the bidder could not be calculated for 4 mergers and the financial
strength of the target firm could not be calculated for an additional 6 mergers. Of the
twenty mergers that are remaining, the G-index of the bidder firm was unavailable for 1
firm. The final sample used to test hypotheses H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b includes 19
mergers. There were 11 additional mergers in which the G-index of the target firm was
unavailable. Including the variable TGINDEX would have reduced the sample to 8
mergers for a model that includes 12 variables and therefore, the variable TGINDEX is
omitted from this examination. Panel B of table 4 presents information on the final
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sample to tests hypotheses H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b.
Of the 28 mergers that produced PE Ratio forecasts, there were 7 mergers in
which BFIN could not be calculated and an additional 4 mergers in which TFIN could
not be calculated. The sample reduction produces a final sample of 17 mergers used to
test hypotheses H3e, H3f, H4c, and H4d. There were an additional 9 mergers in which
the G-index of the target firm was unavailable, therefore, the variable TGINDEX is
omitted from this examination. Panel C of table 4 presents information on the final
sample to test hypotheses H3e, H3f, H4c, and H4d.
The next section of the paper defines the variables used to test each set of
hypotheses.
Table 5 - Hypotheses Three and Four Samples Sample Selection Procedures
Panel A – Forecast Bias Sample
Reduced Sample: Completed Mergers
139 Mergers
Less: Mergers that did not disclose earnings estimates
(82) Mergers
Equals Total number of mergers that disclosed earnings estimates 57 Mergers*
Total number of mergers that provided EPS forecasts
Total number of mergers that provided PE Ratio forecasts

30 Mergers
28 Mergers

Panel B – Characteristics of firms that provide less biased or more accurate EPS
Forecasts
Total number of mergers that provided EPS Forecasts
30 Mergers
Less: Data missing to compute BFIN
(4) Mergers
Less: Data missing to compute TFIN
(6) Mergers
Less: Data missing for BGINDEX
(1) Merger
Equals Hypotheses H3c, H3d, H4a, and H4b final sample
19 Mergers
Panel C – Characteristics of firms that provide less biased or more accurate PE Ratio
Forecasts
Total number of mergers that provided EPS Forecasts
28 Mergers
Less: Data missing to compute BFIN
(7) Mergers
Less: Data missing to compute TFIN
(4) Mergers
Equals Hypotheses H3e, H3f, H4c, and H4d final sample
17 Mergers
*

1 merger provided both an EPS forecast and a PE Ratio forecast creating a total of 58
forecasts from 57 mergers.
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4.2

Variable Definitions

4.2.1

Dependent Variables

4.2.1.1 Merger Completion
To test the first set of hypotheses, the dependent variable (COMPLETE) is
measured as the likelihood of a merger being completed. This variable is gathered from
Thompson Financial’s SDC Database and is a dichotomous variable where the variable is
equal to 1 if the merger is completed and 0 if the merger is withdrawn.
4.2.1.2 Disclosure
To test the second set of hypotheses, the dependent variable (DISC) is measured
as the likelihood of a merger voluntarily disclosing an earnings estimate. This variable is
collected from the joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4) and is a dichotomous variable where
the variable is equal to 1 if the forecasted EPS or the forecasted PE Ratio is voluntarily
disclosed in the joint proxy-prospectus and 0 otherwise. Additionally, this variable is a
dependent variable used to test hypothesis H1a.
4.2.1.3 Forecast Error
Forecast error is calculated using the forecasted EPS or PE Ratio collected from
the joint proxy-prospectus and the actual EPS or PE Ratio gathered from Standard and
Poor’s COMPUSTAT annual files. The variable FE is then calculated as Forecast Error
(FE) = (Forecasted – Actual) / |Actual|). The forecast error is the dependent variable in
the third set of hypotheses and the absolute value of the forecast error is the dependent
variable in the fourth set of hypotheses.
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4.2.2 Independent Variables
4.2.2.1 Financial Strength Measurement
There have been several bankruptcy prediction models introduced into the
literature. Altman [1968], Ohlson [1980], and Zmijewski [1984] are a few of the more
popular bankruptcy prediction models used in accounting research. While these models
are traditionally used to predict the probability of bankruptcy, this study uses the model
to measure stronger or weaker financial characteristics. Since this study is not using the
model to predict bankruptcy and is simply using it as a measure of financial strength,
there should be no preference as to which model is used.
To examine the financial characteristics of firms that provide voluntary earnings
estimates, this study uses the Altman’s Z-Score (Altman [1968]) as a proxy for strong
financial characteristics.

Altman’s Z-score is a bankruptcy prediction model that uses

several measures of financial distress to calculate the probability of bankruptcy and is
calculated using balance sheet and stock return data gathered from Standard and Poor’s
COMPUSTAT annual files. The Z-Score is a weighted average of several accounting
ratios and is calculated using the formula:
Z-Score = (3.3 * EBIT/Total Assets) + (0.99 * Net Sales/Total Assets) + (0.6 * Market
Value of Equity/Total Liabilities) + (1.2 * Working Capital/Total Assets) +
(1.4
*
Retained Earnings/Total Assets
Where,
EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
Market Value of Equity = Stock Price * # Common Shares Outstanding
Working Capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities
(1)
A higher Z-Score indicates a firm is better off financially.
This study does not intend to declare these firms as good or bad, but uses
Altman’s model as an indicator of financial strength to determine if a firm is stronger or
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weaker financially. The variable BFIN is Altman’s Z-score for the bidder firm while the
variable TFIN is Altman’s Z-score of the target firm. BFIN and TFIN are continuous
variables and are the variables of interest in all four sets of hypotheses.
4.2.2.2 Corporate Governance Measurement
The independent variables BGINDEX and TGINDEX are continuous variables
collected from Thompson Financial’s, Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC)
corporate governance database for the bidder and target firms respectively. These are
variables of interest for the second, third, and fourth sets of hypotheses and proxy for the
strength of corporate governance.
Gompers et al. [2003] calculate the G-Index using 22 firm level provisions and 6
state provisions listed in the IRRC database. Eight of these provisions overlap creating a
maximum G-Index of 24. Gompers et al. [2003] break the provisions into 5 groups:
delay tactics, director protection, voting rights, other defenses, and state laws. One point
is added to the firm’s G-Index for each provision that restricts shareholder rights. A
lower G-Index indicates a democracy controlled firm, and therefore, stronger corporate
governance.
The foundation for strong corporate governance is the ability of the board of
directors to act independently of management. Other measures of corporate governance
include board of director size, percentage of outside directors, control of the board by the
CEO or CFO, audit committee characteristics, and the existence of large block
shareholders. Each of these measures serves to protect shareholders’ rights by forcing the
board of directors to act independently of management. This study uses the G-Index to
proxy for strong corporate governance since it was designed to proxy for shareholders’
rights.
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4.2.2.3 Golden Parachute
To test hypotheses H2e, the independent variable (PCHUTE) is a dichotomous
variable where the variable is equal to 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden parachute
in his contract. This variable is gathered by searching the joint proxy-prospectus (form
S-4) to determine whether or not the CEO has golden parachute.
The next section of the paper discusses the control variables included in the
models.
4.2.3

Control Variables

4.2.3.1 Size
This study uses the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for firm size. The
variable BSIZE proxies for bidder size while the variable TSIZE proxies for the size of
the target. The total assets of the firm are gathered for the year prior to the merger
announcement from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT annual files. These variables
are control variables in all four sets of hypotheses.
4.2.3.2 Influence
The variable INFLUENCE is calculated as the total assets of the bidder firm/the
total assets of the target firm. As discussed above, the total assets of both firms are
gathered for the year prior to the merger from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT annual
files. This variable is a control variable in the first set of hypotheses and is a proxy for
the amount of control the bidder firm has over the target firm.
An alternative measurement of influence is the ratio of BSIZE/TSIZE. Each
measurement will be examined to test sensitivity to the specification.
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4.2.3.3 Premium
The variable PREMIUM is defined as Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement
Date-1)

– 1. This measure is collected from Thompson Financial’s SDC database and is a

control variable for the first set of hypotheses.
4.2.3.4 Friendly
As in Brennan [1999], this variable is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the
merger was deemed friendly and 0 otherwise. Thompson Financial’s SDC database
reports a deal as friendly if the target firm’s board of directors recommends the merger.
The variable FRIENDLY is a control variable for the first set of hypotheses.
4.2.3.5 Industry
As in Andrade et al. [2001], the variable INDUSTRY is defined as a dichotomous
variable that equals 1 if both the bidder and target firms have the same 2-digit industry
(SIC) code and 0 otherwise. The SIC code is gathered from Thompson Financial’s SDC
Database and is used as a control variable for the first two sets of hypotheses.
4.2.3.6 Audit
The variables BAUDIT and TAUDIT are dichotomous variables that equal one if
the bidder or target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor respectively. The names of the auditors
were collected from the joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4) from the SEC’s EDGAR
Database. These variables are control variables in all four sets of hypotheses.
4.2.3.7 Underwriter Reputation
The underwriter reputation is measured using a reputation ranking based on
Carter and Manaster [1990] and Carter et al. [1998]. Carter and Manaster [1990] and
Carter et al. [1998] calculate the reputation ranking by examining initial public offering
announcements and assigning an integer rank, 0 to 9, for each underwriter in the
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announcement according to its position. Using the names of the underwriters collected
from the proxy-prospectus, a reputation ranking is assigned based on the rankings
published in the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO Underwriters: 19802004.4 The variables BUWRITER and TUWRITER are control variables include in the
second, third, and fourth sets of hypotheses.
4.2.3.8 Previous Earnings Forecasts
The variable EF is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if either the bidder or
target firm issued an earnings forecast in the year prior to the announcement. A search of
each firm on Lexis-Nexis was used to determine if the firm issued an earnings forecast in
the previous year. This is a control variable included in the second, third, and fourth sets
of hypotheses.
4.2.3.9 Horizon
As in Waymire [1985], the variable HORIZON is the percentage of the year
remaining between the forecasted earnings estimate and the actual earnings. The variable
is continuous and is calculated as the number of days from the forecasted earnings to the
actual earnings/365. This is a control variable in which forecast accuracy and bias should
be less as the variable HORIZON decreases. This is a control variable included in the
third and fourth sets of hypotheses.
Table 6 provides a summary of the variables and the next section describes the
research design used to test each set of hypotheses.

4

Corwin and Schultz [2005] used the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO Underwriters when
examining underwriter prestige.
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Table 6 – List of Variables
Variable

Description

Database

Hypotheses
Used In

COMPLETE

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the merger is completed,
0 otherwise

SDC

H1
Dependent
Variable

DISC

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the firms provide
forward-looking information
(earnings or PE Ratios) of the
combined firm, 0 otherwise

FEEPS

Form S-4

Earnings Per Share Forecast
Error. Calculated as:

Form S-4

|FE = (Forecasted EPS –
Actual EPS)/(Actual EPS)|

COMPUSTAT

PE Ratio Forecast Error –
Calculated as:
FEPE

BFIN

TFIN

BGINDEX

TGINDEX

Form S-4

|FEpe = (Forecasted PE Ratio
– Actual PE Ratio)/(Actual
PE Ratio)|

COMPUSTAT

Bidder firm’s Z-score as
calculated using Altman’s
[1968] formula

COMPUSTAT

Target firm’s Z-score as
calculated using Altman’s
[1968] formula

COMPUSTAT

G-Index from bidder firm
from Gompers et al. [2003]

IRRC

G-Index of target firm from
Gompers et al. [2003]

IRRC
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H1
Independent
Variable

Expected
Sign

+

H2
Dependent
Variable
H3 & H4
Dependent
Variable

H3 & H4
Dependent
Variable
H1

?

H2

?

H3

+

H4

+

H1

?

H2

?

H3

+

H4

+

H2

?

H3

-

H4

-

H2

?

H3

-

H4

-

Table 6 (continued)
Description

Database

Hypotheses
Used In

Expected
Sign

PCHUTE

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the target firm’s CEO has
a golden parachute in their
contract, 0 otherwise

Form S-4

H2

?

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the
Bidder firm’s total assets

COMPUSTAT

All

+

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the
Target firm’s total assets

COMPUSTAT

All

+

INFLUENCE

Bidder firm’s total assets /
Target firm’s total assets

COMPUSTAT

H1

+

PREMIUM

(Offer Price / Target Stock
Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1

SDC

H1

+

FRIENDLY

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the merger is friendly, 0
otherwise

SDC

H1

+

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the bidder and target
firms have the same SIC
Code, 0 otherwise

SDC

H1

+

H2

+

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the bidder firm uses a Big
4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise

H3

+

H4

+

H2

+

H3

+

H4

+

H2

+

H3

+

H4

+

H2

+

H3

+

H4

+

Variable

TAUDIT

BUWRITER

TUWRITER

Form S-4

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if the target firm uses a Big
4/5 auditor, 0 otherwise

Form S-4

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s
Underwriter as reported in the
Carter-Manaster Reputation
Rankings of Underwriters

Form S-4

Rank of the Target Firm’s
Underwriter as reported in the
Carter-Manaster Reputation
Rankings of Underwriters

Form S-4
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Table 6 (continued)
Variable

EF

HORIZON

Description

Database

Dichotomous variable equals
1 if either the bidder or target
firm issued earnings forecast
in the previous period, 0
otherwise

Lexis-Nexis

# of days between earnings
forecast and actual earnings /
365

Form S-4

4.3

Research Design

4.3.1

Voluntary Disclosure and Merger Success

Hypotheses
Used In

Expected
Sign

H2

+

H3

+

H4

+

H3

-

H4

-

To test the prediction that voluntary disclosure is associated with the likelihood of
a merger being completed and to examine the characteristics of the firms that are more
likely to approve the merger, the following logistic regression model is used to test the
first set of hypotheses:
Prob (COMPLETE = 1) = β0 + β1 DISC + β2 BFIN + β3 TFIN + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE
+ β6 INDUSTRY + + β7 FRIENDLY + β8 INFLUENCE + β9 PREMIUM + ε

(2)

where,
COMPLETE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is completed, 0 otherwise

DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same
SIC Code, 0 otherwise

FRIENDLY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is friendly, 0 otherwise

INFLUENCE

Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets

PREMIUM

(Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1
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The variables of interest are DISC, BFIN, and TFIN. A positive relationship
between the disclosure variable (DISC) and completion of the merger indicates that the
voluntary earnings estimates may be used to increase the likelihood of the merger being
completed. The variables BFIN and TFIN are proxies for the financial strength of the
bidder and target firms. A positive relationship between the financial strength of the
firms and the completion of the merger indicates that firms that have stronger financial
characteristics are more likely to complete the merger while a negative relationship
indicates that firms that have weaker financial characteristics are more likely to complete
the merger.
Andrade et al. [2001] found that larger firms that are in the same industry are
more likely to complete a merger, while Brennan [1999] found that friendly mergers were
more likely to be completed. These studies created the necessity to control for firm size,
industry, and bid type. This study uses the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets to
control for size, whether or not the bidder and target firm’s 2-digit SIC code is the same
to control for industry, and whether or not the merger is friendly to control for bid type.
Additionally, other factors that may increase the likelihood of a merger being
completed are the amount of control a bidder firm has over a target firm and the price
premium paid by the bidder firm to purchase the target firm. This study controls for
these additional factors using the variables INFLUENCE and PREMIUM. The next
section examines the research design used to test the second set of hypotheses.
4.3.2

Characteristics of Firms that Voluntarily Disclose Earnings Estimates
To examine the characteristics of firms that voluntarily disclose earnings

estimates, the cross-sectional variations in the probability of disclosing or not disclosing
on various firm characteristics are tested. To test whether firms with stronger or weaker
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financial or corporate governance characteristics voluntarily disclose earnings estimates,
the following logistic regression is estimated to test the second set of hypotheses:
Prob (DISC = 1) =

β0

Test Variables:

+ β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINEX + β4 TGINDEX
+ β5 PCHUTE

Control Variables:

+ β6 BSIZE + β7 TSIZE + β8 BAUDIT + β9 TAUDIT
+ β10 BUWRITER + β11 TUWRITER + β12 EF
+ β13 INDUSTRY

(3)

Where:
Description

Variable
DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

TGINDEX

G-Index of target firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

PCHUTE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden
parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor,
0 otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the
same SIC Code, 0 otherwise

41

The variables of interest are the financial strength variables BFIN and TFIN, the
corporate governance variables BGINDEX and TGINDEX, and whether or not the target
firm had a golden parachute in their contract (PCHUTE).
A positive relationship between the financial strength variables and whether or
not management chooses to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates provides support for
the idea that management is providing as much information as possible to the
shareholders to reduce the information asymmetry between management and
shareholders.

A negative relationship between the financial strength variables and

voluntarily disclosing earnings estimates suggests that firms that are financially weaker
are using this voluntary disclosure to help “sell” the merger to the shareholders.
A higher G-Index implies that a firm is structured more similar to that of a
dictatorship and therefore has weaker corporate governance.

Therefore, a positive

relationship between the corporate governance variables and whether or not management
chooses to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates supports the idea that management is
using the voluntary disclosure to help “sell” the merger to the shareholders while a
negative relationship between the corporate governance variables and whether or not
management chooses to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates suggests that stronger
firms provide more information to help decrease information asymmetry between
management and shareholders.
A golden parachute provides management with an incentive to provide
information that may persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger. If this
rationale is correct, the variable PCHUTE will be positively related to whether or not
management voluntarily discloses earnings estimates.
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Cox [1985], Imhoff [1978] Ruland [1979], and Waymire [1985] found that larger
firms are more likely to provide earnings forecasts. This study controls for this using the
variables BSIZE and TSIZE which are defined as the natural logarithm of the bidder and
target firms’ total assets respectively.
Clarkson et al. [1992] found that firms with higher audit quality and higher
underwriter prestige were more likely to issue earnings forecasts.

Audit quality is

controlled for using a dichotomous variable equaling 1 if the firm uses a Big 4 or Big 5
auditor while underwriter prestige uses the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO
Underwriters to control for underwriter reputation.
Ruland et al. [1990] and Frankel et al. [1995] found that firms that had previously
provided earnings forecasts were more likely to issue earnings forecasts. The variable EF
controls for this by assigning a dichotomous variable of 1 if either the bidder or target
firm provided an earnings forecast in the previous year.
Lastly, Andrade et al. [2001], Gort [1969], Jensen [1986], Jensen [1993], and
Botosan and Harris [2000] provided evidence that firms in the same industry were more
likely to issue earnings forecasts. Mergers between firms in the same industry are
controlled for using the variable INDUSTRY which is a dichotomous variable equaling 1
if the bidder and target firms share the same 2-digit SIC code. The following section
examines the research design used to test the third set of hypotheses.
4.3.3

Earnings Estimate Bias
As discussed in the development of Hypothesis 3, if management is trying to

persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, then these forecasts may be
optimistically biased to sway shareholder votes.
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Since this study examines both EPS and PE Ratio estimates of the merged entity,
the firms are separated into two separate samples. While these are two very different
estimates, both EPS and PE Ratios are used by investors to determine the strength of the
firm. EPS provides the earnings per share of the company for the previous period and the
PE Ratio is used measure investors’ expectation of higher earnings growth.

Since

investors consider higher EPS and PE Ratios to be better, both samples should provide
similar results.
Using these projections, the accuracy of the forecast of the new firm is examined
at the first earnings announcement of the year following the projection. The forecast
error for the earnings forecast will be calculated using the following:

Forecast Error (FEEPS) = (Forecasted EPS– Actual EPS) / |Actual EPS|)

(4)

and the forecast error of the forecasted price-to-earnings ratio will be calculated using:

Forecast Error (FEPE) = (Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) / |Actual PE Ratio|) (5)

A t-test is used to determine if the forecast error for each sample is greater than 0.
I the forecast error is greater than 0, the forecasted earnings are optimistically biased and
management may be voluntarily disclosing information to persuade shareholders to vote
in favor of the merger.
Once bias has been examined, the study now focuses on what firm characteristics
are present when less biased forecasts are presented. The following ordinary least square
(OLS) regression is employed to test hypotheses H3c, H3d, H3e, and H3f:
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FE =

β0

Test Variables:

+ β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX

Control Variables:

+ β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT
+ β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF
+ β11 HORIZON

(6)

Where:
Variable
FE

Description
Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|)

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

BSIZE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor

TSIZE

Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor,
0 otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

HORIZON

# of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365

Some of the same firm characteristics that lead to higher forecast accuracy will
also lead to a smaller forecast bias. The variables of interest are TFIN, BFIN, and
BGINDEX. BFIN and TFIN is the Altman Z-score (Altman [1968]) for the bidder and
target firms respectively and BGINDEX is the G-Index gathered from Thompson
Financial’s IRRC which calculates the G-Index as in Gompers et al. [2003] for the bidder
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firm. Firms that have stronger financial characteristics would have higher Altman Zscores, while firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics would have
lower G-Index’s.
Stronger firms should not have as much of an incentive to provide biased
forecasts as weaker firms. Therefore, stronger firms would provide the forecasts that are
less biased. If firms that have stronger financial characteristics provide less biased
forecasts, the variables BFIN and TFIN will be negatively associated with forecast error.
If firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics provide less biased
forecasts, the variables BGINDEX will be negatively associated with forecast error.
Clarkson et al. [1992] and Clarkson [2000] found that the size of the firm,
whether or not the firm has issued previous earnings forecasts, auditor quality, and
underwriter prestige are all characteristics that may increase the accuracy of earnings
forecasts. This study controls for size using the natural logarithm of total assets, auditor
quality with a dichotomous variable equaling 1 if the firm uses a big 4 or big 5 auditor,
and underwriter prestige by using the Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO
Underwriters to control for underwriter reputation. Whether or not a firm has issued
previous earnings forecasts is controlled for by using a dichotomous variable equaling 1
if either the bidder or target firm issued an earnings forecast in the previous year.
Another characteristic that may increase forecast accuracy is the amount of time
between the forecast date and actual earnings date (Waymire [1985] and McNichols
[1989]). The amount of time between forecasted and actual dates is controlled for using
the variable HORIZON, which is the number of days until year end divided by 365.
The following section examines the final data and research methodology for the
fourth set of hypotheses.
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4.3.4

Characteristics of Firms with Greater Forecast Accuracy
To examine the characteristics of firms that provide more accurate forecasts, the

absolute values of the forecast errors are calculated as in the previous section when
measuring forecast bias. The absolute values of the forecasts are used since this set of
hypotheses are measuring forecast accuracy rather than forecast bias. The absolute
values of the forecast errors for both EPS and PE Ratio are:
|Forecast Error (FEEPS)| = |(Forecasted EPS– Actual EPS) /|Actual EPS|)|

(7)

and
|Forecast Error (FEPE)| = |(Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) /|Actual PE Ratio|)| (8)
To examine the characteristics of firms that provide more accurate forecasts, the
following ordinary least square (OLS) regression is employed to test the fourth set of
hypotheses:
|FE| =

β0

Test Variables:

+ β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX

Control Variables:

+ β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT
+ β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF
+ β11 HORIZON

(9)

Where:
Variable
|FE|

Description
Absolute value of the Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as |FE| = |(Forecast – Actual)/(Actual)|

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

BSIZE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor

TSIZE

Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters
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BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor,
0 otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

HORIZON

# of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365

The variables of interest are BFIN, TFIN, and BGINDEX. The BFIN and TFIN
variables measure the financial strength of the bidder and target firms while the variable
BGINDEX measures the strength of the corporate governance of the bidder firm.
Logic indicates that stronger firms would provide the most accurate forecasts. If
firms that have stronger financial characteristics provide more accurate forecasts, the
variable FIN will be negatively associated with the absolute value of the forecast error. If
firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics provide more accurate
forecasts, the variable GINDEX will be positively associated with the absolute value of
the forecast error.
As in the tests of the third set of hypotheses, the test of the fourth set of
hypotheses controls for firm size, auditor quality, underwriter prestige, whether or not a
firm has issued previous earnings forecasts, and the amount of time between the forecast
date and the end of the year.
Chapter 5 provides the descriptive statistics and empirical results for each set of
hypotheses.

48

5.
5.1

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in the final samples used in

testing the different sets of hypotheses. Only the mean and median of the variables used
in each of the hypotheses are reported and a discussion of each set of hypotheses follows.
The next section examines the final samples used to test the first set of hypotheses.
Table 7 – Descriptive Statistics
H1
H2
H3 and H4
N=92
N=28
EPS Sample
N=19
Variable*

Mean

Med.

COMPLETE

0.95

1.00

DISC
BSIZE
TSIZE
INFLUENCE
PREMIUM
FRIENDLY
INDUSTRY
BAUDIT
TAUDIT
BUWRITER
TUWRITER
EF
HORIZON
BFIN
TFIN
BGINDEX
TGINDEX
PCHUTE
FE
|FE|

0.36
14.81
13.22
22.21
22.31
0.97
0.73

0.00
14.83
13.24
3.80
20.47
1.00
1.00

4.34
3.61

1.78
1.41

Mean

Med.

0.53
15.82
14.34

1.00
15.95
14.21

0.50
0.93
0.93
8.41
8.40
0.54

1.00
1.00
1.00
9.10
9.10
1.00

6.06
3.04
9.14
8.46
0.36

2.91
1.71
8.50
8.00
0.00

Mean

Med.

Mean

Med.

15.85
14.05

15.69
14.02

15.34
13.57

14.87
13.27

0.93
0.93
7.64
7.81
0.40
1.20
4.16
1.97

1.00
1.00
9.00
9.00
0.00
1.13
0.44
0.30

0.89
0.82
6.74
8.19
0.50
0.94
3.41
3.21
10.13

1.00
1.00
9.00
8.10
0.50
0.87
0.47
2.00
10.00

1.11
1.21

0.33
0.48

0.38
0.73

0.07
0.34

* All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 2
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H3 and H4 PE
Ratio Sample
N=17

5.1.1

Hypotheses One
The sample used to test the first set of hypotheses includes all mergers that filed a

proxy-prospectus with the SEC and had enough information to calculate the size and
financial strength of both the bidder and target firms. These criteria yielded a final
sample size of 92 mergers for H1. Ninety of the mergers were considered friendly and 68
of the mergers were between firms in the same industry. The descriptive statistics in
table 7 show that the size of the bidder firm is larger than the size of the target firm and
the bidder firm is better off financially. Additionally, the median value for the financial
strength of the bidder firm (BFIN) is 1.78. According to Altman [1968], a score below
1.80 has a high risk of bankruptcy. This observation may indicate that firms merge to
strengthen their financial outlook.
An examination of the correlations between the independent variables in the
model finds that the correlation between the variables TSIZE and BSIZE is 0.6442 and is
the only correlation above 0.40. The model is tested for multicollinearity using variance
inflation factors (VIF) for each variable. Netter et al. [1990] suggests that a VIF score
above 10 indicates multicollinearity is a problem. The variable TSIZE has a VIF of 3.00
which is the highest VIF in this model and one can conclude that there is a low risk of
multicollinearity. Table 8 presents the correlations between the variables used to test the
first set of hypotheses.
Additionally, Pearson residuals were calculated to test for outliers.

Menard

[2002] indicated that Pearson residuals that are less than -2 or greater than +2 may
identify an observation that would be considered an outlier. All of the Pearson residuals
in the model are between -1 and +1 indicating that there are no outliers.
The next section examines the data used to test the second set of hypotheses.
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Table 8 - Correlation Matrix of Variables Used to Test H1
Variables1

COMPLETE

DISC

TFIN

BFIN

TSIZE

BSIZE

INFLUENCE

PREMIUM

FRIENDLY

COMPLETE

1.000

DISC

0.090

1.000

TFIN

-0.174*

-0.012

1.000

BFIN

-0.361***

0.154

0.426**

1.000

TSIZE

0.050

0.213

-0.350***

-0.245

1.000

BSIZE

0.139

0.217**

-0.209**

-0.331***

0.644**

INFLUENCE

0.067

0.131

0.062

-0.061

-0.301*** 0.252**

1.000

PREMIUM

-0.024

0.067

0.058

-0.022

-0.090

0.073

0.231**

1.000

FRIENDLY

0.263**

-0.055

-0.158

-0.355***

-0.021

0.002

0.038

-0.003

1.000

0.144

0.096

-0.029

-0.068

0.208**

0.127

0.017

-0.010

0.251**

INDUSTRY

1

1.000

All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6
* p<=.10
** p<=.05
*** p<=.01
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INDUSTRY

1.000

5.1.2

Hypotheses Two
The sample used to test the second set of hypotheses is designed to examine the

characteristics of those firms that choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates. To
run this test, financial and corporate governance variables for both the target and bidder
firms must be calculated. These sample criteria left a final sample of 28 observations to
be examined.
As in the previous sample, the bidder firm is larger than the target firm and has
stronger financial characteristics. The variable BSIZE has a mean of 15.82 while the
variable TSIZE has a mean of 14.34. The variable BFIN has a mean of 6.06 and the
variable TFIN has a mean of 3.04. Additionally, both the bidder and target firms in the
H2 sample are larger than in the previous sample that tests the first set of hypotheses.
The size differences between the two samples are 15.82 vs. 14.81 for the variable BSIZE
and 13.22 vs. 14.34 for the variable TSIZE (table 7).
There is also a difference between the bidder firm’s financial strength variable
(BFIN) in the two samples. The variable BFIN has a mean of 6.06 in the H2 sample vs.
4.34 in the H1 sample. While there is a difference of the bidder firm’s financial strength
between samples, both Z-scores signify a firm with little financial distress.
A correlation analysis found that the variables BAUDIT and TAUDIT were
identical and therefore the variable TAUDIT has been dropped from the regression to
correct for multicollinearity.

Additionally, the size variables BSIZE and TSIZE have a

correlation of 0.7461. VIFs for each variable were calculated and TSIZE has the largest
VIF of 4.47 indicating a slight risk of multicollinearity. An additional test is performed
to increase the sample size and verify results. Table 9 presents the correlations between
the variables used to test the second set of hypotheses.
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Table 9 - Correlation Matrix of Variables Used to Test H2

Varables1

DISC

BFIN

TFIN

BGINDEX

TGINDEX

PCHUTE

INDUSTRY

BSIZE

TSIZE

DISC

1.000

BFIN

0.267

1.000

TFIN

0.180

0.804**

1.000

BGINDEX

-0.197

-0.234

-0.406***

1.000

TGINDEX

-0.200

-0.295

-0.254

0.251

1.000

PCHUTE

-0.053

-0.176

-0.057

0.191

0.193

1.000

INDUSTRY

-0.016

-0.307

-0.189

-0.085

0.260

-0.011

1.000

BSIZE

-0.114

-0.414**

-0.328

0.117

0.546***

0.054

0.286

1.000

TSIZE

-0.067

-0.541***

-0.482***

0.301

0.629***

0.064

0.438**

0.746

1.000

BAUDIT

0.020

0.063

0.136

-0.408

0.191

-0.083

0.061

0.192***

0.171

TAUDIT

0.020

0.063

0.136

-0.408

0.191

-0.083

0.061

0.192

0.171

BUWRITER

-0.206

0.173

0.180

0.093

0.85

-0.311

-0.194

-0.201

-0.025

TUWRITER

0.012

0.146

0.190

0.027

0.093

-0.170

0.301

-0.110

0.071

0.101

0.096

-0.162

0.138

-0.065

EF

-0.005
-0.046
0.140
-0.342*
All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6
* p<=.10
** p<=.05
*** p<=.01
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Table 9 (continued)
BAUDIT

TAUDIT

BUWRITER

BAUDIT

1.000

TAUDIT

1.000

1.000

BUWRITER

-0.030

-0.030

1.000

TUWRITER

-0.098

-0.098

0.077

EF

TUWRITER

EF

1.000

0.020
-0.020
0.259
-0.109
All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6
* p<=.10
** p<=.05
*** p<=.01

1.000

1
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To test for outliers, Pearson residuals were calculated and all residuals are
between -1 and +1 indicating that there are no outliers in the sample.

The next section

examines the data used to test EPS forecast bias and accuracy.
5.1.3

Hypotheses Three and Four EPS Sample
The sample used to test these sets of hypotheses is designed to examine factors

that may influence EPS forecast bias and accuracy. To test these characteristics, all
financial and corporate governance variables for the bidder and target firm must be
calculated. Due to the lack of data availability, the corporate governance variable for the
target firm was not examined. The final sample used to test EPS forecast bias and
accuracy includes 19 mergers.
The bidder and target firms are slightly larger than the sample that tests the first
set of hypotheses. Note that the mean forecast error and absolute forecast error are much
larger than the median and there is a large difference between the mean and median of the
bidder and target firms’ financial variables. The variable BFIN has a mean of 4.16 which
would indicate a financially stable firm while the median is just 0.44 which indicates a
firm is financially distressed. The variable TFIN has a mean of 1.97 and a median of
0.30 (Table 6).
VIFs for each variable were examined and the variables EF and TUWRITER each
had VIFs above 4.

VIFs above 4 indicate that there may me some indication of

multicollinearity introduced in the model. The correlation between these two variables is
0.68 indicating that they are highly correlated. A large correlation is not uncommon with
a sample size this small and additional tests are performed to verify results. Table 9
presents the correlations between the variables used to test bias and accuracy of the EPS
sample.
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Pearson residuals were used to test for outliers and all residuals fell between -1.7
and +1.7. While these are higher than the other samples, they are between the -2 and +2
that Menard [2002] describes as outliers and therefore no observations were deleted. An
additional test is performed to the sensitivity of variable specification of the financial
strength variables. The next section examines the data used to examine PE Ratio forecast
accuracy and bias.
5.1.4

Hypotheses Three and Four PE Ratio Sample
The sample used to test these sets of hypotheses is designed to examine factors

that may influence the PE Ratio forecast bias and accuracy. To test these characteristics,
financial and corporate governance variables for the bidder and target firm must be
calculated. As in the EPS sample, the strength of the target firm corporate governance
was not examined due to the lack of corporate governance data availability. The final
sample used to test PE Ratio forecast bias and accuracy is 17 mergers.
Once again, there is a difference between the mean and median of the forecast
error and absolute forecast error in addition to the mean and median of the financial
strength variables BFIN and TFIN (table 6). Pearson residuals fell between -0.2 and +0.2
indicating that no outliers were present.
VIFs for each variable were calculated and the variables BGINDEX and BFIN
had VIFs OF 4.18 and 4.11 respectively. High VIFs are to be expected from a sample
size this small and additional tests are performed to verify results. Table 11 presents the
correlations between the variables used to test bias and accuracy in the PE Ratio sample.
The next section provides the empirical results of the first set of hypotheses.
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Table 10 - Correlation Matrix of Variables used to Test H3 and H4 (EPS Sample)
Variables1

FEEPS

BFIN

TFIN

BGINDEX

BSIZE

TSIZE BAUIDT TAUDIT BUWRITER TUWRITER

EF

HORIZON

FEEPS

1.000

BFIN

0.345

1.000

TFIN

0.227

0.197

1.000

BGINDEX

0.098

-0.304

-0.657***

1.000

BSIZE

-0.091

-0.352

-0.232

0.214

1.000

TSIZE

0.243

-0.398*

-0.296

0.241

0.685***

1.000

BAUDIT

0.108

0.160

0.133

0.183

0.148

0.072

1.000

TAUDIT

-0.005

0.109

0.088

-0.227

0.161

0.187

-0.081

1.000

BUWRITER

0.219

0.250

0.177

-0.044

-0.251

0.012

-0.044

0.304

1.000

TUWRITER

0.296

0.404*

0.336

-0.546**

-0.216

0.041

-0.142

-0.002

0.287

1.000

EF

0.409*

0.597***

0.501**

-0.462*

-0.092

-0.087

0.262

0.180

0.403*

0.683***

1.000

HORIZON

0.062

0.167

-0.113

0.008

-0.367

-0.167

-0.194

0.117

0.190

0.348

0.203 1.000

1

All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6
* p<=.10
** p<=.05
*** p<=.01
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Table 11 - Correlation Matrix of Variables used to Test H3 and H4 (PE Ratio Sample)
FEPE

Variables1

BFIN

TFIN

BGINDEX

BSIZE

TSIZE

BAUIDT

TAUDIT

BUWRITER

TUWRITER

EF

FEPE

1.000

BFIN

-0.387

1.000

TFIN

-0.272

0.499**

1.000

BGINDEX

-0.186

-0.299

0.019

1.000

BSIZE

0.337

-0.533

-0.170

-0.156

1.000

TSIZE

-0.124

-0.390

-0.254

-0.250

0.4852**

1.000

BAUDIT

0.064

0.023

0.071

0.028

0.277

0.152

1.000*

TAUDIT

0.166

0.242

0.139

-0.510**

0.155

0.111

0.433

1.000

BUWRITER

0.055

0.409

0.203

-0.209

-0.351

-0.061

-0.134

0.430*

1.000

TUWRITER

-0.449*

0.414*

0.407

-0.003

-0.185

0.062

-0.161

0.262

0.567**

1.000

EF

0.006

0.152

-0.149

-0.349

-0.178

0.096

-0.436*

-0.066

0.420*

0.221

1.000

0.162

0.115

0.058

-0.254

-0.274

-0.345

-0.672***

-0.059

0.328

0.067

0.352

HORIZON

1

All variables are as defined in chapter 4 and summarized in table 6
* p<=.10
** p<=.05
*** p<=.01
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HORIZON

1.000

5.2

Empirical Results

5.2.1

Test of H1: Voluntary Disclosure and Merger Success
The first set of hypotheses theorizes that management uses the voluntary

information to increase the likelihood of the merger being completed. Using a dependent
variable equal to 1 if the merger is completed and 0 if the merger is withdrawn, it is
expected that larger firms in the same industry classified as friendly bids are more likely
to be completed. Another factor that may increase the likelihood of a merger being
completed is when the acquiring firm has significant influence over the target company
or if there is a sufficiently large price premium paid to the target.
The primary variables of interest are the disclosure variable, DISC, and the
financial variables BFIN and TFIN. If management succeeds in using the voluntary
disclosure of earnings estimates to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger,
the voluntary disclosure of forward-looking information will be positively related to the
completion of the merger.
Table 12 reports the coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (2).
Even with the small number of withdrawn mergers in the sample the chi-square
test revealed a p-value of 0.1423. The disclosure variable (DISC) is insignificant, thus
hypothesis H1a is not supported. The variable BFIN, which measures the financial
strength of the bidder firm, has a negative coefficient of -0.0961 and has a p-value of
0.083, thus supporting hypothesis H1b. This negative coefficient may indicate that
bidder firms that are not doing as well financially may be seeking other ways to become
stronger. One way that a firm may get stronger is to merge with another company and
combine their resources to gain market share and reduce costs. Finally, the financial
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strength variable of the target firm (TFIN) is insignificant; therefore hypothesis H1c is
not supported.
Table 12 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable
indicating whether the merger was completed.
Prob (COMPLETE = 1) = β0 + β1 DISC + β2 BFIN + β3 TFIN + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE
+ β6 INDUSTRY + β7 FRIENDLY + β8 INFLUENCE + β9 PREMIUM + ε
Intercept
DISC
BFIN
TFIN
BSIZE
TSIZE
INDUSTRY
FRIENDLY
INFLUENCE
PREMIUM
N
LR Chi2 (9)
Prob > Chi
Pseudo R2
where:

2

Coefficient

Standard Error

z-statistic

p-value

5.762
2.705
-0.096
-0.072
-0.159
-0.992
1.366
0.247
0.045
-0.015
92 Total

5.742
2.098
0.055
0.103
0.694
0.717
1.168
2.184
0.089
0.023
86 Completed

1.00
1.29
-1.73
-0.70
-0.23
-0.14
1.17
0.11
0.51
-0.65
6 Withdrawn

0.316
0.197
0.083
0.484
0.816
0.890
0.242
0.910
0.611
0.518

13.47
0.142
0.060

COMPLETE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is completed, 0 otherwise

DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same
SIC Code, 0 otherwise

FRIENDLY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is friendly, 0 otherwise

INFLUENCE

Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets

PREMIUM

(Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1
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Results of the model testing the first set of hypotheses could be sensitive to the
specification of a couple of variables; therefore, additional tests are performed to examine
the sensitivity of the specification of the variables INFLUENCE, BFIN, and TFIN.
The study defines the variable INFLUENCE as the bidder firm’s total assets / the
target firm total assets. Another way to define the variable INFLUENCE is BSIZE /
TSIZE.

Defining influence as BSIZE / TSIZE created a multicollinearity problem

between the three size variables (BSIZE, TSIZE, and INFLUENCE) and therefore cannot
be tested.
The financial strength variables of BFIN and TFIN could be defined as
dichotomous variables equaling 1 if the financial strength is above the mean and 0
otherwise.
Table 13 reports the coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (2) with new
variable definitions for BFIN and TFIN. The variable DISC used to test hypothesis H1a
remains insignificant, the variable BFIN used to test hypothesis H1b is negative and
significant, and the variable TFIN used to test hypothesis H1c is insignificant. The
negative and significant coefficient for the variable BFIN confirms the suggestion that
bidder firms that are weaker are more likely to complete a merger.
5.2.2

Test of H2: Characteristics of Firms that Voluntarily Disclose Earnings
Estimates

To examine the characteristics of firms that voluntarily disclose earnings estimates, crosssectional variations in the probability of disclosing or not disclosing are tested on various
firm characteristics.
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Table 13 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable indicating
whether the merger was completed.

Prob (COMPLETE = 1) = β0 + β1 DISC + β2 BFIN + β3 TFIN + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE
+ β6 INDUSTRY + β7 FRIENDLY + β8 INFLUENCE + β9 PREMIUM + ε
Coefficient

Standard Error

z-statistic

p-value

Intercept

5.763

5.742

1.00

0.316

DISC

2.705

2.099

1.29

0.197

BFIN

-0.096

0.055

-1.73

0.083

TFIN

-0.724

0.103

-0.70

0.484

BSIZE

-0.159

0.694

-0.23

0.819

TSIZE

-0.099

0.717

-0.14

0.890

INDUSTRY

1.366

1.168

1.17

0.242

FRIENDLY

0.023

2.183

0.11

0.910

INFLUENCE

0.045

0.089

0.51

0.611

PREMIUM

-0.014

0.023

-0.65

0.518

92 Total

86 Completed

6 Withdrawn

N
2

LR Chi (9)

13.47

2

0.142

Prob > Chi
2

Pseudo R

0.060

where:

COMPLETE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is completed, 0 otherwise

DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm’s Z-score is above the
mean Z-scores in the sample as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula, 0
otherwise

TFIN

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s Z-score is above the mean
Z-scores in the sample as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula, 0
otherwise

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the same
SIC Code, 0 otherwise

FRIENDLY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the merger is friendly, 0 otherwise

INFLUENCE

Bidder firm’s total assets / Target firm’s total assets

PREMIUM

(Offer Price / Target Stock Price (Announcement Date -1)) – 1
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This set of hypotheses examines whether a firm’s financial characteristics,
corporate governance, and the presence of a golden parachute influence whether or not a
firm voluntarily discloses earnings estimates while controlling for size, whether the firms
are in the same industry, type of auditor, and quality of underwriter. Weak financial and
corporate governance characteristics would indicate that management is using the
voluntary information to persuade shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, while
stronger financial and corporate governance characteristics would suggest that stronger
firms are more likely to provide more information to their shareholders.
Table 14 reports coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (3). The small
number of observations has created a weak test in which the chi-square test revealed a pvalue of 0.267.
The financial strength variables of the bidder and target firms have different signs.
The variable BFIN has a coefficient of 0.7734 and is significant at the 0.055 level (H2a)
and the variable TFIN has a negative coefficient of -0.4053 and an insignificant p-value
of 0.209 (H2b). With a correlation between BFIN and TFIN of 0.1413, it is unlikely the
result can be explained by multicollinearity. While TFIN is insignificant, conclusions on
its sign may be drawn with this small sample size. A positive coefficient for BFIN
indicates that bidder firms that are stronger financially are more willing to disclose
earnings estimates than those bidder firms that are weaker. This finding goes along with
the suggestion that the bidder firms that are stronger financially are more willing to
provide information. This suggestion, along with the weak finding that target firms that
are weaker financially are more likely to provide earnings forecasts, may indicate that
bidder and target firms use these forecasts to sway shareholder votes of the bidder firm.
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At this time, this study is not examining the quality of the information but whether or not
the information was disclosed.

The variables testing BGINDEX, TGINDEX, and

PCHUTE used to hypotheses H2c, H2d, and H2e were all insignificant.
The variable TSIZE was positive and significant at the .05 level as in studies by
Cox [1985], Imhoff [1978], Ruland [1979], and Waymire [1985].

Unlike Clarkson

[1992], the variable for underwriter reputation, BUWRITER, is negative and significant
at the .10 level indicating that an underwriter with a weaker reputation is more likely to
provide an earnings forecast. This finding could be from the small sample size or that
underwriters with weaker reputations may need to disclose more information in a merger
and acquisition setting to decrease the information asymmetry between the firm and its
shareholders.
As an additional test, the sample size used to test the second set of hypotheses is
expanded by omitting the corporate governance variables BGINDEX and TGINDEX.
Omitting the corporate governance variables increases the sample size to 92 mergers and
provides a more powerful test. The increase in power comes with the cost of creating the
problem of omitted variables. Omitted variable bias occurs if the omitted variables
BGINDEX or TGINDEX are a determinant of the dependent variable DISC and
correlated with at least one other independent variable. The following logistic regression
is tested:
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Prob (DISC = 1) =

β0

Test Variables:

+ β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 PCHUTE

Control Variables:

+ β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT
+ β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF
+ β11 INDUSTRY

(10)

Where:
Variable

Description

DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

PCHUTE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden
parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor,
0 otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the
same SIC Code, 0 otherwise

Table 15 reports the coefficients, standard errors, z-statistics, p-values, number of
observations, likelihood ratio chi-square test, and pseudo R2 for equation (10). The chi65

square test revealed a goodness of fit at the .02 level indicating that the model fits the
data. As previously reported, the variable indicating the financial strength of the bidder
firm, BFIN, is positive and significant indicating that firms that are stronger financially
are more willing to provide earnings estimates in the joint proxy-prospectus.
Table 14 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable
indicating whether the firm voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates
Prob (DISC = 1) = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINEX + β4 TGINDEX + β5 PCHUTE
+ β6 BSIZE + β7 TSIZE + β8 BAUDIT + β9 BUWRITER + β10 TUWRITER + β11 EF
+ β12 INDUSTRY
Coefficient
10.627

Standard Error
10.30

z-statistic
1.03

p-value
0.302

BFIN

0.773

0.403

1.92

0.055

TFIN

-0.405

0.323

-1.26

0.209

BGINDEX

-0.181

0.313

-0.58

0.562

TGINDEX

-0.471

0.318

-1.48

0.139

PCHUTE

-0.451

1.440

-0.31

0.754

BSIZE

-0.669

0.481

-1.39

0.164

TSIZE

2.013

0.947

2.12

0.034

BAUDIT

-0.836

2.241

-0.37

0.709

BUWRITER

-2.422

1.323

-1.83

0.067

TUWRITER

-0.340

0.319

-1.07

0.287

EF

0.112

1.775

0.06

0.950

INDUSTRY

-1.211

1.512

-0.80

0.423

Intercept

N

28

LR Chi2 (12)

14.59

Prob > Chi2

0.265

Pseudo R2

0.377

where:
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Table 14 (continued)
DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

TGINDEX

G-Index of target firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

PCHUTE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden
parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor,
0 otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

INDUSTRY

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder and target firms have the
same SIC Code, 0 otherwise
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Table 15 - Summary statistics from logistic regression of indicator variable
indicating whether the firm voluntarily disclosed earnings estimates
Prob (DISC = 1) = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 PCHUTE + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE
+ β6 BAUDIT + β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF
+ β11 INDUSTRY
Coefficient
-6.416

Standard Error
2.710

z-statistic
-2.37

p-value
0.018

BFIN

0.059

0.317

1.85

0.064

TFIN

-0.170

0.531

-0.32

0.749

PCHUTE

0.530

0.487

1.09

0.277

BSIZE

0.259

0.160

1.62

0.106

TSIZE

0.115

0.213

0.54

0.588

BAUDIT

-1.776

1.090

-1.63

0.103

TAUDIT

0.521

0.963

0.54

0.589

BUWRITER

0.119

0.100

1.19

0.236

TUWRITER

0.511

0.139

0.37

0.714

EF

0.621

1.097

0.57

0.571

INDUSTRY

0.401

0.597

0.67

0.502

Intercept

N

100

LR Chi2 (12)

21.81

Prob > Chi2

0.026

Pseudo R2
Where:

0.167
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Table 15 (continued)
DISC

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firms provide forward-looking
information (earnings or PE Ratios) of the combined firm, 0 otherwise

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

PCHUTE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm’s CEO has a golden
parachute in their contract, 0 otherwise

BSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Bidder firm’s total assets

TSIZE

Natural Logarithm of the Target firm’s total assets

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

5.2.3

Test of H3: Earnings Estimate Bias

5.2.3.1 Are Earnings Estimates Biased?
To conduct the tests of the third set of hypotheses, the sample is limited to
companies choosing to provide EPS estimates or projected PE Ratios for the merged
entity. The forecast errors are examined to determine if these forecasts are biased. As
discussed in the development of Hypothesis 3, if management is trying to persuade
shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, then these optimistic forecasts may be used to
sway shareholder votes.
Table 16 provides the results of the t-test for the EPS and PE Ratio samples. The
t-statistic of 2.84 for the EPS sample suggests that firms provide EPS forecasts that are
69

optimistically biased at the 0.01 level. This optimism indicates that firms may use
earnings forecasts to persuade the shareholders to vote in favor of the merger, thus
supporting hypothesis H3a.
The PE Ratio sample is not significantly different from zero with a t-statistic of
1.200 and is therefore not biased. Capstaff and Paudyal [1998] found that PE Ratios tend
to move toward the market PE Ratio. This t-test rejects hypothesis H3b. Capstaff and
Paudyal’s finding suggests that the PE Ratio forecasts would be less biased than EPS
forecasts.
Table 16 - Earnings Estimates > 0
Panel A – Forecasted Earnings per Share
One sample t-test of H3a: FEEPS > 0 where:
(Forecast Error (FEEPS) = (Forecasted Earnings – Actual Earnings) / |Actual Earnings|)
Mean

Std. Error

Std. Dev.

t-statistic

P-value

1.107

0.391

2.140

2.84

0.004

n = 30

Panel B – Forecasted Price-to-Earnings Ratios
One sample t-test of H3b: FEPE > 0 where:
(Forecast Error (FEPE) = (Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) /(| Actual PE Ratio|)
Mean

Std. Error

Std. Dev.

t-statistic

P-value

0.384

0.320

1.692

1.20

0.120

n = 34
As an additional test of whether firms provide an optimistic forecast, a Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Test is performed on the forecast errors of the EPS and PE Ratio samples to
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determine if the forecast errors are different from 0.
The forecast errors for the EPS sample are calculated as:
Forecast Error (FEEPS) = (Forecasted Earnings per Share– Actual Earnings per Share) /
|Actual Earnings per Share|)
(4)
and the forecast errors for the forecasted PE Ratio sample are calculated as:
Forecast Error (FEPE) = (Forecasted PE Ratio – Actual PE Ratio) / |Actual PE Ratio|) (5)
Table 17 presents the results for both samples. As indicated with the t-test, the
EPS sample is significant at the .01 level indicating that the earnings forecasts are
optimistically biased (H3a).
The PE Ratio sample that provides insignificant results in the t-test does not
provide significant results in the signed-rank test (H3b), again reflecting that the
forecasted PE Ratios are not biased.
The next section examines the factors that may decrease earnings forecast bias.
Table 17 - Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
Panel A – Earnings Per Share Sample

Positive
Negative
Zero
All

Observations
23
7
0
30

Z
Prob > |z|

3.538
0.0004

71

Sum Ranks
404.5
60.5
0
465

Expected
232.5
232.5
0
465

Table 17 (continued)
Panel B – Price-to-Earnings Ratio Sample

Positive
Negative
Zero
All

Observations
14
14
0
28

Z
Prob > |z|

0.706
0.4802

Sum Ranks
234
172
0
406

Expected
203
203
0
406

5.2.3.2 Characteristics of Firms that Provide Less Biased Forecasts
An additional test examines the potential factors affecting bias. Tables 18 and 19
present coefficients, standard errors, t-statistics, p-values, and adjusted R-square for
equation (6). Table 18 presents the results for the EPS sample and table 19 presents the
results for the PE Ratio sample.
In the EPS sample, Table 18 reports an adjusted R-square of 0.3812 for a model
that consists of only 19 observations. Both financial strength variables and the bidders’
corporate governance variable are significant at the 0.1 level. The financial strength
variables are both positive indicating that firms that are stronger financially are more
likely to have biased forecasts. This is opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis H3c.
Hypotheses H3c suggests that firms that are stronger financially should have less
incentives to bias forecasts. The inconsistency could come from the difference between
the mean and median of financial strength variables in the sample. Additional tests are
preformed to test for sensitivity in variable specification.
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The corporate governance variable for the bidder firm (BGINDEX) is also
positive.

This finding, as expected, indicates that firms with stronger corporate

governance characteristics provide less biased forecasts, thus supporting hypothesis H3d.
The only significant control variable is the variable TSIZE which positive and
significant at the .05 level. Additionally, the variable BSIZE is negative and marginally
significant at the .11 level. The variables TSIZE and BSIZE have a correlation of 0.6852
which may be causing the sign differences between the variables. With no bias in the
PE Ratio sample, it is no surprise that the model is weak and no variables are significant.
While Table 19 presents the results for this sample, hypotheses H3e and H3f are
inconclusive.
The differences between the mean and median of the financial strength variables
necessitate the need to examine the sensitivity to the specification of the variables BFIN
and TFIN. These variables are defined as continuous variables which are calculated as
the Altman Z-score of the bidder and target firms respectively. To test specification of
these variables, equation (6) is re-estimated using a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
the financial strength variable is greater than the mean and 0 otherwise.
Additionally, to correct for the possible multicollinearity between the variables
BSIZE and TSIZE, equation (6) is re-estimated after deleting each variable.
While the results of the tests are not reported, the two financial variables lose
significance in every test causing the previous finding of H3c to be inconclusive. The
corporate governance variable BGINDEX remains significant at the 0.1 level reaffirming
the finding that firms with stronger corporate governance characteristics provide less
biased EPS forecasts (H3d).
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The next section examines the characteristics of firms with greater forecast
accuracy.
Table 18 - Characteristics of Firms Providing Less Biased EPS Forecasts
FEEPS = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept

-6.233

6.782

-0.92

0.389

BFIN

0.088

0.045

1.96

0.091

TFIN

0.293

0.126

2.33

0.053

BGINDEX

0.448

0.193

2.32

0.053

BSIZE

-0.530

0.293

-1.81

0.113

TSIZE

1.122

0.395

2.84

0.025

BAUDIT

-2.113

1.335

-1.58

0.157

TAUDIT

-0.373

1.860

-0.20

0.847

BUWRITER

-0.243

0.197

-1.23

0.257

TUWRITER

-0.258

0.592

-0.44

0.676

EF

1.667

1.422

1.17

0.279

HORIZON

-0.211

0.827

-0.25

0.806

N

19

F(11,5)

2.01

Prob > F

0.182

R-squared

0.759

2

Adj.-R

0.381

Where:
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Table 18 (continued)
FE

Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|)

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

BSIZE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor

TSIZE

Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

HORIZON

# of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365

FE

Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|)
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Table 19 - Characteristics of Firms Providing Less Biased PE Ratio Forecasts

FEPE = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept

2.849

2.726

1.05

0.344

BFIN

-0.063

0.497

-1.27

0.261

TFIN

-0.001

0.032

-0.03

0.979

BGINDEX

-0.078

0.086

-0.90

0.409

BSIZE

0.076

0.084

0.90

0.409

TSIZE

-0.174

0.109

-1.59

0.173

BAUDIT

0.033

0.673

0.05

0.963

TAUDIT

-0.133

0.684

-0.19

0.854

BUWRITER

0.104

0.068

1.54

0.185

TUWRITER

-0.144

0.147

-0.98

0.373

EF

-0.058

0.336

-0.17

0.869

HORIZON

-0.019

0.532

-0.36

0.736

N

17

F(11,5)

1.05

Prob > F

0.513

R-squared

0.698

Adj.-R2

0.034

where:
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Table 19 (continued)
FEPE

Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|)

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

BSIZE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor

TSIZE

Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor,
0 otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the CarterManaster Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

HORIZON

# of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365

FE

Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as FE = (Forecast – Actual)/(|Actual|)

5.2.4

Test of H4: Characteristics of Firms with Greater Forecast Accuracy
Using only mergers that provided either a projected EPS or a projected PE Ratio

of the new firm, equation (9) examines the characteristics of those firms that provide
more accurate forecasts. Since there is little incentive to provide negatively biased
forecast, one expects that these results should mirror the results in the previous section.
Table 20 reports results of equation (9) for the EPS sample, and Table 21 reports
the results of equation (9) of the PE Ratio sample. The next section examines the EPS
sample.
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5.2.4.1 EPS Sample
In the EPS sample, Table 20 reports an adjusted R-square of 0.4445 with a total of
only 19 observations. Once again, both financial strength variables and the corporate
governance variable of the bidder firm are significant. The variable BFIN is positive and
significant at the 0.1 level while the variable TFIN is positive and significant at the 0.05
level. This finding is opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis H4a. Hypothesis
H4a hypothesized that firms that are stronger financially would provide more accurate
forecasts while the results suggest that firms that are stronger financially produce the less
accurate forecasts. Alternative tests are performed to test the sensitivity of variable
specification for the financial strength variables.
The variable BGINDEX which measures the strength of the corporate governance
of the bidder firm is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. This finding indicates that
bidder firms with stronger corporate governance are more likely to produce more
accurate forecasts, thus supporting hypothesis H4b
As in the EPS forecast bias sample, the variable BSIZE has a positive coefficient
and is significant, while the variable TSIZE has a negative coefficient and is marginally
significant at the 0.12 level. The significance may be explained by their correlation of
0.6852.
The differences between the mean and median of the financial strength variables
create the need to examine alternative measures of BFIN and TFIN. Using dichotomous
variables for BFIN and TFIN equaling 1 if the financial strength variable is greater than
the mean and 0 otherwise, an additional test of equation (9) is performed. The financial
strength variables become insignificant indicating that BFIN and TFIN are sensitive to
variable specification and therefore indicates that hypothesis H4a is inconclusive. The
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corporate governance variable, BGINDEX, remains significant at the 0.1 level while.
This finding confirms that firms with stronger corporate governance tend to provide more
accurate forecasts (H4b).
Table 20 - Characteristics of Firms Providing More Accurate EPS Forecasts

|FEEPS| = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept

-8.365

6.271

-1.33

0.224

BFIN

0.085

0.042

2.04

0.081

TFIN

0.313

0.116

2.68

0.031

BGINDEX

0.510

0.178

2.86

0.024

BSIZE

-0.475

0.271

-1.75

0.123

TSIZE

0.997

0.365

2.73

0.029

BAUDIT

-1.873

1.234

-1.52

0.173

TAUDIT

0.172

1.719

0.10

0.923

BUWRITER

-0.251

0.182

-1.38

0.211

TUWRITER

-0.111

0.547

-0.02

0.984

EF

1.301

1.315

0.99

0.355

HORIZON

-0.271

0.764

-0.35

0.733

N

19

F(11,5)

2.31

Prob > F

0.138

R-squared

0.784

Adj.-R2

0.445

where:
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Table 20 (continued)
|FE|

Absolute value of the Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as |FE| = |(Forecast – Actual)/(Actual)|

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

BSIZE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor

TSIZE

Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

HORIZON

# of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365

5.2.4.2 PE Ratio Sample
In the PE Ratio sample, Table 21 reports an adjusted R-square of 0.6726 with
only 17 observations.

The variable TFIN is negative and significant at the 0.1 level

while the variable BFIN is insignificant. This finding indicates that a target firm that is
stronger financially provides more accurate PE Ratio forecasts providing results that are
contrary to the prediction of hypothesis H4c. Additional tests are performed to test the
sensitivity of variable specification.
The variable BGINDEX, which is a measure of the corporate governance strength
of the bidder firm, is insignificant and, therefore, does not support hypothesis H4d.
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The results also show that the coefficient for TSIZE is negative and significant
while the variable BSIZE is insignificant at the .23 level and positive. This result is
probably due to some multicollinearity in the sample. Additional multicollinearity issues
may have also caused the variables BAUDIT and TAUDIT have opposite signs.
Table 21 - Characteristics of Firms Providing More Accurate PE Ratio Forecasts

|FEPE| = β0 + β1 BFIN + β2 TFIN + β3 BGINDEX + β4 BSIZE + β5 TSIZE + β6 BAUDIT
+ β7 TAUDIT + β8 BUWRITER + β9 TUWRITER + β10 EF + β11 HORIZON
Coefficient

Standard Error

t-statistic

p-value

Intercept

-0.021

0.904

-0.02

0.983

BFIN

0.020

0.016

1.23

0.274

TFIN

-0.023

0.010

-2.25

0.075

BGINDEX

-0.004

0.029

-0.13

0.900

BSIZE

0.038

0.028

1.35

0.234

TSIZE

-0.089

0.036

-2.45

0.058

BAUDIT

0.582

0.223

2.61

0.048

TAUDIT

-0.218

0.227

-0.96

0.380

BUWRITER

0.033

0.022

1.48

0.198

TUWRITER

0.018

0.049

0.37

0.724

EF

0.199

0.111

1.79

0.134

HORIZON

0.308

0.176

1.74

0.142

N

17

F(11,5)

2.01

Prob > F

0.182

R-squared

0.759

Adj.-R2

0.381

where:
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Table 21 (continued)
|FE|

Absolute value of the Forecast Error of the forward-looking information.
Calculated as |FE| = |(Forecast – Actual)/(Actual)|

BFIN

Bidder firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

TFIN

Target firm’s Z-score as calculated using Altman’s [1968] formula

BGINDEX

G-Index from bidder firm from Gompers et al. [2003]

BSIZE

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor

TSIZE

Rank of Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

BAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the bidder firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

TAUDIT

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the target firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor, 0
otherwise

BUWRITER

Rank of the Bidder Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

TUWRITER

Rank of the Target Firm’s Underwriter as reported in the Carter-Manaster
Reputation Rankings of Underwriters

EF

Dichotomous variable equals 1 if either the bidder or target firm issued
earnings forecast in the previous period, 0 otherwise

HORIZON

# of days between earnings forecast and actual earnings / 365

To test for the sensitivity to specification of the financial strength variables,
equation (9) is re-estimated using dichotomous variables for BFIN and TFIN that are
equal to 1 if the financial strength variable is above the mean and 0 otherwise. As in the
EPS sample, the variable TFIN becomes insignificant indicating that the financial
strength variable is sensitive to specification. This finding provides inconclusive results
for hypotheses H4c.
Additionally, with this estimation, the variable BGINDEX is negative and
significant at the 0.1 level. As with the results of the PE Ratio sample examining factors
that decrease forecast bias, the results of the PE Ratio sample used to examine
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characteristics of firms with greater forecast accuracy are inconclusive (H4d).
Table 22 provides a summary of findings and chapter 6 summarizes and draws
conclusions from the results of the analysis.
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Table 22 - Summary of Findings
H1a: Voluntary disclosure of earnings estimates increases the
likelihood that a merger will be completed.
H1b: There is an association between the financial strength of the
bidder firm and the likelihood of the merger being completed.
H1c: There is an association between the financial strength of the
target firm and the likelihood of the merger being completed.
H2a: There is an association between the financial strength of the
bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H2b: There is an association between the financial strength of the
target firm and the decision of the merging firms to jointly choose to
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H2c: There is an association between the strength of the corporate
governance of the bidder firm and the decision of the merging firms to
jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H2d: There is an association between the strength of the corporate
governance of the target firm and the decision of the merging firms to
jointly choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H2e: There is an association between target firms that have CEO
golden parachutes and the decision of the merging firms to jointly
choose to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates.
H3a: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the EPS forecast of the new firm
is positively biased.
H3b: For voluntarily disclosing firms, the PE Ratio forecast of the new
firm is positively biased.
H3c: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
H3d: Lower EPS forecast bias of the combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H3e: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated
with merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
H3f: Lower PE Ratio forecast bias of the combined firm is associated
with merging firms that have stronger corporate governance
characteristics.
H4a: EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics.
H4b: EPS forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance characteristics.
H4c: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger financial characteristics..
H4d: PE Ratio forecast accuracy of combined firm is associated with
merging firms that have stronger corporate governance.
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Not Supported
Negative
Not Supported
Positive
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Inconclusive
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Inconclusive
Supported
Inconclusive
Inconclusive

6.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Most voluntary disclosure studies have one thing in common; the studies examine
management decisions to provide voluntary information to the shareholders of their firm.
In the case of a merger or acquisition, management is now providing information on what
could be considered a new firm: a new firm that consists of both the bidder and the target
firms. Mergers and acquisitions provide a unique setting in which management may
decide to voluntarily disclose earnings estimates for reasons other than just providing an
earnings benchmark.
The objective of this study is to examine the characteristics of those firms that
voluntarily disclose earnings estimates in the proxy-prospectus when completing a
merger or acquisition.

With management already agreeing on its post-merger

compensation, there is an incentive for management to provide shareholders with enough
information to ensure that the merger is completed. These voluntarily disclosed earnings
estimates provide one way for management to provide additional information to their
shareholders.
6.1

Summary and Implications
The first test of this study examines the effects that the managements’ voluntary

disclosure decisions and the bidder and target firms’ financial characteristics have on
whether or not the merger is completed. Results suggest that shareholders of bidder firms
that are weaker financially are more likely to approve a merger. One reason that these
shareholders of weaker firms may vote in favor of the merger is to try to get stronger by
merging with another firm. By merging, firms are able to combine their resources to gain
market share and reduce costs by creating synergy between the two firms.
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Examining the characteristics of the firms that jointly choose to voluntarily
disclose earnings estimates provides insight as to which types of firms are more likely to
provide earnings estimates during a merger or acquisition. Results suggest that bidder
firms with stronger financial characteristics are more apt to voluntarily disclose earnings
estimates. While this finding may suggest that firms that are stronger financially provide
more information to their shareholders to reduce information asymmetry, an alternative
explanation could be that bidder firms that are stronger financially may need to provide
more information to convince their shareholders that the target firm will provide value to
the bidder firm.
Next, this study examines the forecast error of the earnings forecasts to determine
if the earnings forecasts are biased. Results indicate that for those firms that provided
EPS forecasts, the forecasts were optimistically biased. The finding that firms with
stronger financial characteristics are more likely to provide earnings forecasts combined
with the result that the EPS forecasts are optimistically biased suggest that these
voluntary EPS forecasts may be used to enhance the future outlook of the combined firm.
Enhancing the future outlook of the combined firm could persuade shareholders of both
the bidder and target firms to vote in favor of the merger.
Lastly, the characteristics of the firms that provided voluntary earnings estimates
were examined to find that firms with stronger corporate governance provided more
accurate and less biased EPS forecasts. This finding indicates that corporate governance
is doing what it was intended to do - protect shareholders’ rights. If firms with stronger
corporate governance provide more accurate and less biased forecasts, then management
must be governed in a way to enhance the accuracy of the information provided to their
shareholders.
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6.2

Limitations
There are several limitations associated with this study. Being that this study

examines the joint proxy-prospectus (form S-4) of a merger or acquisition, the sample is
a small percentage of the number of announced mergers. Firms must provide a joint
proxy-prospectus whenever stock is included in the transaction to complete the merger.
Therefore, a joint proxy-prospectus is only filed for approximately 5% of the total
mergers announced.
Additionally, to provide for a more manageable dataset, only the mergers with
transaction values of $1,000,000 or more were examined. This creates a large firm bias
that may affect the results.
Lastly, the years 2002 and 2003 were used in the sample to provide the two most
recent years that earnings data could be gathered for three years after the merger
announcement. While there is no reason to believe that these two years would provide
results that would be significantly different from other years, there is a possibility that a
difference may exist.
6.3

Future Research
This study has created a unique data set which will be expanded throughout my

career. Mergers and acquisitions provide a unique and interesting setting in which
management and shareholder incentives may not be aligned.
As the data set is expanded, there are many questions that could be answered
involving the voluntary disclosure provided during a merger or acquisition.

These

questions may consist of how analysts or institutions use the voluntary information or
how these forecasts may affect the future performance of the new firm.
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The following are examples of questions that may be asked of analysts’ use of the
voluntary information. Are analysts able to use the forecasts to determine the future
performance of the combined firm? Do analyst base buy and sell recommendations on
the forecasts?
Questions involving the use of the voluntary information from institutional
ownership include: how does institutional ownership react to the forecasts? Do the
institutions sell the stock once the firms issue a joint earnings forecast?

Are the

institutions able to determine which forecasts are optimistically biased? Each of these
questions examines how accounting users outside of the firm view the voluntary
information provided by management.
The merger and acquisition setting is different from the normal financial
accounting and reporting setting in that managers have incentives other than just
providing an earnings benchmark to their shareholders.

Mangers are providing

information on a new firm that has not yet been created.

This dataset provides a

foundation in which these differences in management incentives can be investigated.
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